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The International Law
Commission’s First Draft
Convention on Crimes Against
Humanity: Codification,
Progressive Development, or
Both?
Charles C. Jalloh 1
Abstract
In 2017, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) which was
established by the UN General Assembly in 1947 to assist States with
the promotion of (1) the progressive development of international law
and (2) its codification, adopted on first reading a draft convention on
crimes against humanity which it transmitted to States for comments.
The draft convention seeks to help fill the present gap in the law of
international crimes since States criminalized genocide in 1948 and war
crimes in 1949, but missed the opportunity to do so for crimes against
humanity. This Article examines the first reading text, as submitted to
States in August 2017, using the lens of the ILC’s two-pronged
mandate. Part II explains how the ILC selects new topics and the
reasons why it decided to study crimes against humanity with the view
to proposing a convention. Part III discusses positive features of the
draft crimes against humanity convention, highlighting key aspects of
each of the draft articles. Part IV examines challenges posed by the
ILC’s definition of the crime, immunities, amnesties, and the lack of a
proposal on a treaty monitoring mechanism. The final part draws
tentative conclusions. The author argues that, notwithstanding the
formal distinction drawn by the ILC Statute between progressive
development, on the one hand, and codification, on the other hand, the
ILC’s approach to the crimes against humanity topic follows an
established methodology of proposing draft treaties that are judged
1.

Professor of Law, Florida International University and Member,
International Law Commission and Chair of the Drafting Committee, 70th
session. This paper was initially prepared for a 70th anniversary
symposium on “The Role and Contributions of the ILC to the
Development of International Law: Codification, Progressive
Development, or Both?” held at FIU College of Law in Miami on 26-27
October 2018. I thank Dean Michael Scharf for inviting me to present on
the topic in the Case Western Law School symposium on “Atrocity
Prevention: The Role of International Law and Justice” on 20 September
2019, which nudged me to finalize this piece. Ashira Vantrees, Cecilia
Ruiz Lujan, Jennifer Triana provided excellent research assistance.
Opinions and errors are mine alone. Email: jallohc@gmail.com.
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likely to be effective and broadly acceptable to States rather than
focusing on which provisions reflect codification and which constitute
progressive development of the law. It is submitted that, if the General
Assembly takes forward the ILC’s draft text to conclude a new crimes
against humanity treaty after the second reading, this will make a
significant contribution to the development of modern international
criminal law.

Table of Contents
Abstract ......................................................................................... 331
Table of Contents.......................................................................... 332
I.

Introduction ........................................................................... 333

II.

Background: The ILC’s Process and the Decision to Study
Crimes against Humanity ....................................................... 341
A. The General Assembly and Proprio Motu Action as Two Potential
Sources of New ILC Topics ........................................................ 341
B. The Addition of Crimes against Humanity to the Long-Term
Program of Work ...................................................................... 343
C. The Addition of Crimes against Humanity to the Current Program
of Work.................................................................................... 346

III. Positive Aspects to the ILC’s First Draft Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Humanity ................................................................................ 348
A. An Opportunity to Prepare a Draft Convention for the General
Assembly .................................................................................. 348
B. The ILC’s “Composite” Approach to its Mandate and Application
to Crimes against Humanity ....................................................... 349
C. Draft Article 1—Scope of the Draft Articles................................... 355
D. Draft Article 2—General Obligation .............................................. 355
E. Draft Article 3—Definition of Crimes against Humanity ................. 358
F. Draft Article 4—Obligation of Prevention ...................................... 361
G. Draft Article 5—Non-Refoulement ................................................ 363
H. Draft Article 6—Criminalization under National Law ..................... 365
I. Draft Article 7—Establishment of National Jurisdiction .................. 367
J. Draft Article 8—Investigation ...................................................... 369
K. Draft Article 9—Preliminary Measures When an Alleged Offender
is Present ................................................................................. 371
L. Draft Article 10—Aut Dedere Aut Judicare ................................... 372
M. Draft Article 11—Fair Treatment of the Alleged Offender ............... 374
N. Draft Article 12 – Victims, Witnesses, and Others.......................... 376
O. Draft Article 13—Extradition ....................................................... 378
P. Draft Article 14—Mutual Legal Assistance .................................... 379
Q. Draft Article 15—Settlement of Disputes ....................................... 380
IV. Some Potentially Problematic Aspects of the First
Reading Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity ......... 381
A. General Remarks ........................................................................ 381
B. The Use of the ICC Definition of Crimes Against Humanity ............ 382

332

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
The International Law Commission’s First Draft Convention on Crimes
Against Humanity
C. Failure to Prohibit Immunities for Crimes Against Humanity .......... 389
D. Failure to Reject Blanket Amnesties for Crimes Against Humanity... 397
E. Absence of a Recommendation on a Monitoring Mechanism ............ 400
V.

Conclusion ............................................................................... 404

I.

Introduction

The
International
Law
Commission
(“ILC”
or
“the Commission”) was established as a subsidiary body of the United
Nations General Assembly in November 1947 to assist States with the
promotion of the progressive development of international law and its
codification. 2 This mandate is not only the statutory foundation on
which the work of the ILC rests, but it is also at the heart of the
discussions involving the ILC’s past contributions, its present projects,
and if the statute remains unamended, its future potential.

2.

G.A. Res. 174 (II), art. 1, Statute of the International Law Commission
(Nov. 21, 1947).
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In the seven decades since it was established, the Commission has
been widely praised, by States 3 and academics 4 alike, for its various
contributions to the development of the field of international law. The
Commission’s inputs include areas as diverse as the law of treaties, 5 the

3.

Miguel de Serpa Soares, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and
United Nations Legal Counsel, Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary
of the International Law Commission—1st Meeting (May 21, 2018),
http://webtv.un.org/search/commemoration-of-the-70th-anniversary-ofthe-international-law-commission/5787804822001#t=22m35s
[https://perma.cc/5J5Q-XNQM]; See also, e.g., Amadou Jaiteh, First
Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Gambia to the United Nations,
Statement on Behalf of the African Group Before the Sixth Committee,
73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Seventieth Session, at
2
(Oct.
22,
2018),
http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/20304330/gambia-africangroup-82-.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX2U-8496]; H.E. Sheila Carey,
Permanent Representative of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the
United Nations, Statement on Behalf of the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,
Report of the International Law Commission of the Work of its Seventieth
Session,
at
2
(Oct.
22,
2018),
http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/20304299/bahamas-caricom82-.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AH9-PK3S]; Xu Hong, Statement of the
Representative of China and Director-General of the Department of
Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 73rd Session
of the United Nations General Assembly, Report of the International Law
Commission of the Work of its Seventieth Session, at 2 (Oct. 22, 2018),
http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/20304363/china-82-clusteri.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K726-2DEL];
Eduardo
Valencia-Ospina,
Statement of the Chair of the International Law Commission, 73rd Session
of the United Nations General Assembly, Report of the International Law
Commission of the Work of its Seventieth Session, at 1 (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ga/sixth/73rdsession/statements/ [https://perma.cc/N754-S8MS].

4.

JEFFREY S. MORTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (U. of S. C. Press, 2000); SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (Grotius Publications Ltd, 1987).

5.

See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of the First Part of Its
Seventeenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/181, at 156–59 (1965),
https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/reports/a
_cn4_181.pdf&lang=EF [https://perma.cc/465U-GUUK]; Int’l Law
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/191,
at
173–77
(1966),
https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/reports/a
_cn4_191.pdf&lang=EFSRC [https://perma.cc/MJ4J-XYQ8].
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law of diplomatic and consular relations, 6 the law of the sea,7
international environmental law, 8 and of course, the law of State
responsibility. 9 Much, if not all, of the Commission’s work in those areas
reflects the aspects of its mandate to assist States with both the
codification and the progressive development of international law. But,
arguably none of these areas, although foundational to the post World
War II international legal order, have permeated the work of the
Commission throughout the last seven decades as much as the field of
international criminal law. Only two exceptions come to mind.
First is the Law of Treaties. The Law of Treaties, which might be
the Commission’s most important contribution to date, formed the
basis for what eventually became the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (“VCLT”). 10 Its significance is further exemplified by
the many subsequent “spin-off” projects it has generated for the
Commission since its entry into force. 11 Those studies, largely aimed at
accounting for lessons learned following decades of application of the
VCLT to concrete situations as well as new developments, continue to
dominate the Commission’s program of work. 12 Indeed, entire studies
have been conducted based on provisions, and in some cases, sections
6.

See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session 1966,
supra note 5, at 177; See also G.A. Res. 3233 (XXIX) (Nov. 12, 1974).

7.

See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session 1966,
supra note 5, at 192.

8.

See Luis Barrionuevo Arevalo, The Work of the International Law
Commission in the Field of International Environmental Law, 32 B.C.
ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 493, 493 (2005).

9.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session 1966,
supra note 5, at 177; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1 (James Crawford
ed., Cambridge University Press, 2002).

10.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.

11.

See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session,
U.N. Doc. A/70/10, at 138 (2015) [hereinafter Rep. in Sixty-Seventh
Session].

12.

Id. (including the topic Jus cogens—a study of VCLT art. 53—in the
Commission program of work) [hereinafter Rep. on Sixty-Seventh
Session]; Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fourth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/67/10, at 105 (2011) (including the topic Provisional
application of treaties—a study of VCLT art. 25—to the Commissions
program of work); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its
Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 12 (2018) (completing the
second reading of Draft Conclusions on subsequent agreements and
subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties—a study
of VCLT art. 31(2)(a)—submitted to the General Assembly in 2018)
[hereinafter Rep. on Seventieth Session].
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or paragraphs of articles from the VCLT. For instance, the Commission
has completed additional work on reservations to treaties 13 (section 2
of the VCLT, comprised of Articles 19 to 24) and subsequent
agreements and subsequent practice (Article 31(3)). 14 The Commission
has ongoing work on provisional application of treaties (Article 25) and
peremptory norms of general international law—jus cogens (Articles
53/64). 15 Not to mention, at the request of the General Assembly, the
application of the VCLT to unresolved questions concerning treaties
concluded between States and international organizations or between
international organizations. 16
The second exception of an area that continues to influence the
work of the Commission are the Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts. 17 The State responsibility articles have
not (yet) been transformed into a multilateral convention, like the
VCLT. The study on State responsibility coincided with the bulk of the
Commission’s existence. An outcome of about 40 years of work over a
seventy-year period. 18 In fact, from the commencement of the study in
1956 and its completion upon second reading and eventual submission
with a final recommendation to the General Assembly in 2001, the topic
was guided by no less than five ILC Special Rapporteurs. 19 Questions
of responsibility have also continued to generate further work for the

13.

See Rep. on Seventieth Session, supra note 12, at 12 (draft conclusions on
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the
interpretation of treaties submitted to the General Assembly in 2018).

14.

Id. at 14; See also G.A. Res. 73/202, at 1–2 (Dec. 20, 2018).

15.

See Int’l L. Comm’n, Summaries of the Work of the International Law
Commission,
https://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_12.shtml
[https://perma.cc/9BZP-6Q7C] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020); Rep.
Seventieth Session, supra note 12, at 227.

16.

See U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations or between International Organizations,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.129/15, U.N. Sales No. E.94. V.5 at 95 (Mar. 21, 1986) (not
yet in force: 39 Signatories, 44 Parties).

17.

See James Crawford, Jacqueline Peel & Simon Olleson, The ILC’s Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Completion
of the Second Reading, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963, 963 (2001),
http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/12/5/1557.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VYS3SKAA].

18.

Id.

19.

See id.
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ILC, in relation to, for example, the responsibility of international
organizations 20 and issues of State succession. 21
This article examines the role and contributions of the ILC in the
promotion of the progressive development of international law and its
codification from the perspective of the nascent field of International
Criminal Law (“ICL”). Though not unique, if we account for the law
of treaties—which, like a ghost, continues to hang around the corridors
of the Commission—and the sheer scope and depth of State
responsibility, the ICL field appears to have occupied a special place in
the life of the ILC. This is because the Commission’s first project,
mandated to it by the General Assembly on November 27, 1947, was
in fact the formulation of the principles of international law recognized
in the Charter and in the Judgment of the Nürnberg International
Military Tribunal (“IMT”). 22 Recognizing the importance of this
maiden ICL topic for the Commission appears important for both
symbolic and substantive reasons.
Symbolically, the IMT was the first successful attempt to establish
an ad hoc “international” penal tribunal to prosecute persons
responsible for crimes under international law: namely, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace. 23 Thus, although
the idea had been first planted just after World War I, it was World
War II and the establishment of the IMT sitting at Nürnberg that
cracked the door open to the hitherto unknown possibility of an
international criminal tribunal that would address responsibility to
individuals as part of the enforcement of certain fundamental values of
the international community, Nürnberg became the “Grotian” 24
20.

See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/66/10, at 54–68 (2011).

21.

Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Nov.
6, 1996, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. Conference of Succession of States in
respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts,
U.N. Sale No. E.94.V.6 (Apr. 8, 1983) (not yet in force); See also Pavel
Šturma (Special Rapporteur on Succession of States in Respect of State
Responsibility), Second Rep. on Succession of States in Respect of State
Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/719 (Apr. 6, 2018).

22.

Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN/SER.A/1950/Add. I.

23.

See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Annex, Charter of the International
Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.

24.

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS (Cambridge
University Press, 2013).
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moment for ICL. The new Commission was thereafter tasked with
reflecting upon the implications of that watershed for States and the
international community. 25 This included the possibility of developing
an international criminal code 26 and a corresponding international
enforcement mechanism to give effect to its prohibitions. 27
Substantively, the principles formulated by the Commission for the
General Assembly now form part of the starting point and thus the
bedrock of modern ICL. This is largely due to the foundational nature
and broad acceptance28 of the Nürnberg Principles, which in seven
broad strokes helped to cement a new global norm—that is, the notion
that any person who commits an act constituting a crime under
international law, such as crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity, is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.29
The Nürnberg Principles, by taking up key issues that continue to be
the basis of international criminal prosecutions, have directly and
indirectly played a role in influencing international law’s attitude
towards the rights and duties of individuals as well as the obligations
of States under international criminal law.
25.

See G.A. Res. 177 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947).

26.

G.A. Res. 36/106, ¶¶ 1–2 (Dec. 10, 1981).

27.

G.A. Res. 260 (III) B, ¶¶ 1–3 (Dec. 9, 1948).

28.

See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision
Pursuant to Art. 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Refusal of the Republic
of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court
with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir,
¶
13
(Dec.
13,
2011),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_04203.PDF
[https://perma.cc/8RJTLNKE]; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
Corrigendum to the Decision Pursuant to Art. 87(7) of the Rome Statute
on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation
Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender
of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 43 (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_21750.PDF
[https://perma.cc/MR5G6JEA]; Prosecutor v Tadić , Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) [https://perma.cc/3TULTGUW]; Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, ¶
485 (Nov. 28, 2007), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/casedocuments/ictr-99-52/appeals-chamber-judgements/en/071128.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3A4P-RLMK]; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL03-1-T,
Judgement
Summary,
¶
2
(Apr.
26,
2012),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/1283/Charles%20Ta
ylor%20Summary%20Judgement.pdf [https://perma.cc/85EH-3R28].

29.

See, e.g., Principles of International Law, supra note 22 (explaining
Principle III to mean that the official capacity of the criminal is irrelevant
and Principle IV to mean that nations have a general obligation to
prevent and punish crimes against humanity).
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Nonetheless, the Commission’s contribution to ICL did not end
with the Nürnberg Principles. In fact, it proved to be just the beginning.
It has since covered a diverse set of ICL issues; most prominently, the
question of international criminal jurisdiction, a draft code of crimes
against the peace and security of humankind, and ultimately, work on
a draft statute for a permanent international criminal court. 30 Since its
early forays in the subject area, often at the request of the General
Assembly, the Commission has also, through its own initiative, taken
up several topics aimed at advancing the largely twentieth century
notion of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes,
alongside mechanisms for the enforcement of such prohibitions—
whether at the national or international levels.
The ILC’s work in this area, some of which is ongoing as of this
writing, has touched on central and inter-related topics for this subfield. These include the question concerning the definition of aggression,
which for reasons largely relating to the Cold War bounced back and
forth for several years between the Commission and the Sixth
Committee like ping-pong until the General Assembly itself completed
the task with the adoption of a resolution on the topic by consensus in
1974; 31 the obligation to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut
judicare); 32 immunity of State officials from foreign criminal
jurisdiction; and most recently, crimes against humanity. The
Commission appears open to the prospect of continuing to work in the
area of criminal law with the addition to its long-term program of work
in 2006 of the topic extraterritorial jurisdiction. 33 Even more recently based on a proposal of this writer, approved in 2018 - and included in
its report to the General Assembly on the work of its seventieth session,
the ILC placed the topic universal criminal jurisdiction in its long-term
program of work. 34
This article will not examine all the ILC’s rich contributions to the
development of the ICL field. Rather, its aim is to examine a specific
30.

G.A. Res. 489 (V) (Dec. 12, 1950); Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, A/CN.4/L.532 (1996), reprinted in [1996]
2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2)
[hereinafter Peace and Security]; Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court with Commentaries, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 20,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2).

31.

See THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 124–25 (United
Nations Publ’n, 9th ed. 2017) (summarizing the completion of the topic
of aggression in 2010).

32.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/69/10, at 139-40 (2014); G.A. Res. 69/118, ¶ 3 (Dec. 10, 2014).

33.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/61/10, at 526 (2006).

34.

Rep. on Seventieth Session, supra note 12, at 316.
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and contemporary ICL topic which some might consider the
Commission’s current flagship project because it is the only explicitly
declared convention project: the Commission’s first Draft Convention
on Crimes Against Humanity, 35 which draft was completed during the
sixty-ninth session in August 2017 and submitted to States for
comments via the General Assembly in September 2017. As usual, the
Commission has invited State comments on the first reading text. 36 All
States’ comments are due at the beginning of December 2018. 37
The primary goal of the article, which focuses on the text as
adopted on first reading, is to examine the positive, and less positive,
aspects of the ILC’s draft convention from the lens of codification and
progressive development. The paper, in seeking to highlight key aspects
of what will hopefully eventually form part of the ILC’s latest
codification contribution to the development of ICL, will suggest that
even in highly technical areas, the theme of progressive development
and codification, which is so central to the work and identity of the
Commission, continues to remain important. The underlying feature of
progressive development and codification, though it did not per se drive
the debate on this topic as it has on other current topics such as
immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, seemed to
lurk in the background. The background hum of the Commission’s
mandate may be among the best explanations for the more contentious
parts of the crimes against humanity project, which generally aims to
provide substantive clarity on the vital aspects of probably the most
important of the four core international crimes: crimes against
humanity.
Structurally, this article will proceed as follows. Part II seeks to
provide some of the background context for the study. It explains the
internal ILC process for the selection of new topics and considers why
the crimes against humanity project seems important for both the ILC
and the international community. Part III, which is the heart of the
article, will examine each of the proposed articles and highlight some
of the most prominent features of the draft convention as proposed by
the Commission in its 2017 first reading text. Part IV then turns to the
aspects of the text adopted by the ILC in relation to which I had some
doubts. With respect to each of these parts, I will attempt to explain
how the mandate of progressive development and codification could be
relevant in appreciating the debate within the Commission and the
35.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/72/10, at 10–20 (2017).

36.

Id. at 10.

37.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law
Commission, https://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/7_7.shtml (last updated Feb.
19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FJ9J-5G74].

340

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
The International Law Commission’s First Draft Convention on Crimes
Against Humanity

compromise text that was adopted and submitted to States for their
consideration. The final part draws tentative conclusions.
Readers must bear in mind that there remains a final second
reading step for the crimes against humanity project, which is expected
to be completed during the 71st session of the Commission in 2019.38 It
is normal that, based on the comments of States and observers, some
of the text adopted on first reading will change. A formal
recommendation will thereafter be formulated by the Commission to
accompany its final text to the General Assembly. At that stage, it will
be up to the States to decide whether to take forward the item by
convening a diplomatic conference or through direct negotiation of the
treaty text by the General Assembly. 39 It is hoped that, after many
years of placing on the shelf the more recent outcomes of the
Commission’s outputs, the General Assembly and States will see it fit
to take forward the draft convention proposed by the ILC. In this way,
they will not only better mind the present big gap in the prohibition of
atrocity crimes, but also re-establish the relevance of the Commission’s
current work and its central role as the only general UN created body
engaged in assisting them with the tasks of codification and progressive
development of general international law.

II. Background: The ILC’s Process and the Decision
to Study Crimes against Humanity
A.

The General Assembly and Proprio Motu Action as Two Potential
Sources of New ILC Topics

By way of background, there are two principal methods by which
the ILC can carry out its statutory responsibilities to study
international law questions for States and the international community.
First, under the Statute, adopted by States in 1947, the General
Assembly, other principal UN organs or specialized agencies may refer
topics to the ILC for study in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the Commission. 40 While this occurred relatively frequently
in the past in relation to the General Assembly, including in respect of
several ICL topics including the draft statute for a permanent
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) which was requested in 1994,

38.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 9-10.

39.

See id. at 5.

40.

G.A. Res. 174 (II), arts. 16-17, Statute of the International Law
Commission (Nov. 21, 1947).
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such referrals have been infrequent more recently. 41 The latter was
noticed, so much so that in 1996, the ILC review of its working
procedures at the request of the General Assembly itself emphasized to
the parent body that States and other relevant UN organs be
encouraged to submit proposals for new topics involving codification
and progressive development of international law. 42
Second, the ILC is statutorily entrusted with surveying the whole
field of international law with the goal of selecting topics for
codification and recommending them to the General Assembly. 43 Much
of the Commission’s work carried out in the past several decades was
based on the first such survey of possible codification projects in a
memorandum of the Secretariat in 1949. In its practice, dating back to
1949, the Commission concluded that it possessed the competence to
work on proposed studies notified to States through the General
Assembly for their feedback without necessarily first securing formal
action before it proceeds. 44 This aspect apparently recognizes the
independent role of the ILC as an expert body.
In reality, however, topics usually receive feedback from States
after their addition to the long-term program of work before substantive
work begins. This preserves the central role of States in the process and
underscores the role of the technical experts is merely to assist the
General Assembly in its primary responsibility to promote international
cooperation in the political field and the promotion of the progressive
development of international law and its codification. 45 This means that
ILC proposed topics usually benefit from feedback and are formally
endorsed or taken note of in a General Assembly resolution. 46 It is only
after such a step that, based on several additional considerations like
the nature of the comments received, that the ILC will take a separate
and subsequent decision on whether to study the proposed topic further
41.

See United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
https://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm [https://perma.cc/9FDKCPMH].

42.

Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its
Forty-Eighth Session, 51 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10
(1996), 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Sales No. E.97.I.1.

43.

G.A. Res. 174 (II), supra note 40, art. 18.

44.

Int’l L. Comm’n, About the Commission: Organization, Programme and
Methods of Work, https://legal.un.org/ilc/programme.shtml (last
updated Sept. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/W6AK-33V2] [hereinafter
Programme and Methods].

45.

See United Nations, Codification and Progressive Development of
International Law, https://legal.un.org/cod/ [https://perma.cc/YA5WAXRL].

46.

See Programme and Methods, supra note 44.
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by moving it into its active program of work. 47 A topic that does not
generate any interest amongst States is unlikely to make it into the
current program of work. 48 Topics that only generate lukewarm interest
or that are perceived as mostly political or policy oriented may also
meet the same fate. 49 That said, while there is a rigorous process for
inclusion of topics into the long-term program of work, the assessment
of the potential suitability of topics for the active work program turns
on various other considerations and becomes a matter of collective
judgment. 50 The latter process, being sometimes dependent on whether
a handful of oppositional members are willing to concede or block the
(overwhelming) majority view, could no doubt be improved.
B.

The Addition of Crimes against Humanity to the Long-Term
Program of Work

Perhaps unsurprisingly, and due also to the increased development
of other fora and sites of law making for States, the second path
discussed above wherein topics are mostly internally generated has
formed the basis for most of the ILC’s work and outputs in the past
seventy years. 51 Of late, for various complex reasons, it has been the
only path. This means that, like all the Commission’s current projects,
the topic crimes against humanity, which is the focus here, began with
a proposal initiated by a member. 52 The proposal in this case was
presented by Sean Murphy (USA). All member proposals are considered
by the Working Group on the Long-Term Program of Work, which is
a subsidiary body of the Planning Group. 53 The latter is established by
the Commission to which it reports and retains the same membership

47.

Programme and Methods, supra note 44.

48.

See Yota Negishi, The International Law Commission Celebrating Its 70th
Anniversary, ESIL: Reflections (Nov. 12, 2018), https://esil-sedi.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/ESIL-Reflection-Negishi-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/94RA-VV4G].

49.

See id.

50.

See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session,
supra note 35, at 126 (noting with appreciation the decision of the
Commission to add the topic of provisional application of treaties to the
Commissions programme of work, thus showing the need for General
Assembly support).

51.

See Programme and Methods, supra note 44.

52.

See Int’l Law Comm’n, Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly During Its Sixty-Ninth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/678, at 21-22 (2015).

53.

See Programme and Methods, supra note 44.
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each year. 54 A topic proposal must fulfill certain criteria agreed by the
Commission in 1996 and reiterated in 1998 before it can secure
approval. 55
As part of a multi-stage internal review process, in the more recent
practice, the long-term program working group operating on the basis
of consensus decides whether the formal topic selection criteria have
been fulfilled. In this regard, it carefully assesses (1) whether a given
proposal appears to meet the needs of States in respect of the
progressive development and codification of international law; (2) if the
topic is sufficiently advanced in stage in terms of State practice; and
(3) if the topic is concrete and feasible, provided that (4) the
Commission shall not restrict itself to traditional topics but could also
reflect those newer and pressing concerns of the international
community as a whole. 56 In this case, in regards crimes against
humanity, the working group concluded that all these criteria had been
fulfilled. 57
The principal argument in favor of the crimes against humanity
topic was that there exists, in the present international legal framework,
a yawning gap in the field of ICL. 58 In particular, as it relates to the
law of “core international crimes,” that is, genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and although the last was not mentioned in the
proposal, the crime of aggression. 59 Whereas genocide and war crimes
have been codified in standalone multilateral treaties requiring States
to investigate and prosecute those who commit them within their
national courts, there is no equivalent global convention concerning
crimes against humanity. 60 Considering that the latter crime is the
54.

Int’l
Law
Comm’n,
About
the
Commission,
https://legal.un.org/ilc/structure.shtml (last updated Jan. 11, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/BH33-ARQB].

55.

Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its
Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 42, at 87-88.

56.

Programme and Methods, supra note 44.

57.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/68/10, at 144 (2013).

58.

Id. at 140-41.

59.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].

60.

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
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broadest crime available, vis-à-vis the other core crimes, the need to
codify it in its own separate instrument and thereby provide greater
legal certainty in its use becomes very important.
As a second main justification, there is at present no regime of
inter-State cooperation providing for mutual legal assistance and
extradition for crimes against humanity at the horizontal level. 61 Yet,
perhaps partly because of how suppression or transnational crimes
conventions have evolved on a separate track vis-à-vis atrocity crimes,
the international community has developed such cooperation regimes
for numerous transnational crimes conventions such as corruption.62
The latter may be considered less heinous crimes than crimes against
humanity. 63 By providing for a treaty that would address crimes against
humanity specifically, it was felt that this could enhance the
investigation and prosecution of crimes at the national level.64
Empowering domestic courts to prosecute crimes against humanity is
distinct from the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals such as
the ICC, which operates at the vertical/international level. 65 Thus,
especially given that the Rome Statute does not as such include an
explicit duty for States to prosecute crimes against humanity but
requires States to act as the first line of defense against impunity, a
special convention on crimes against humanity was found as a potential
useful complement of that system. 66 This should
enhance the
complementarity regime under the ICC system. In the end, based on
the syllabus proposal, it was decided that it was about time that the
ILC considered taking up this important topic with the view of
potentially assisting States to codify this important international crime
in a separate treaty aimed at both prevention and punishment of those
who perpetrate it. 67
75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of
international armed conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
61.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 110.

62.

Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity), First
Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/680, at 6 (Feb.
17, 2015) [hereinafter Murphy, First Rep.]

63.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 21.

64.

Id.

65.

Id. at 22.

66.

Id.

67.

Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 7.
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As usual with the Commission topic selection process, the decision
of the working group on the work program is reported to the parent
Planning Group chaired by the first vice chair of the Commission for
that session. 68 The Planning Group, in turn, reports to the plenary of
the ILC as a whole. 69 The Commission, after consideration of the report,
endorsed the working group decision at the level of the plenary of the
Commission which then subsequently decided to recommend the
inclusion of the topic crimes against humanity to the Long-Term
Program of Work during the Sixty-Fifth Session. 70 The crimes against
humanity topic, the syllabus for which was annexed to the 2013 report,
was thereafter notified to the General Assembly with a request for
feedback from States on the proposed topic. 71 There, States proved to
be generally favorable towards the topic, though there was some
concern that whatever the Commission does in the topic, should
complement rather than undermine the legal regime anchored by the
ICC. 72 The General Assembly took note of the topic in its resolution
that year. 73
C.

The Addition of Crimes against Humanity to the Current Program
of Work

Upon resumption of its work in the summer of 2014, the ILC
analyzed the feedback of States on the crimes against humanity
proposal in the General Assembly. 74 Given the generally favorable State
reactions towards the topic, and the availability of space on its program
of work, the Commission decided to move crimes against humanity on
to the Commission’s current program of work. 75 Consistent with the
ILC practice, Mr. Murphy, the proponent of the topic was appointed
as Special Rapporteur. 76 Special rapporteurs play an important role for
the Commission in a volunteer capacity, helping to guide the
formulation of a plan and leading the effort on the topic. 77 The special
68.

About the Commission, supra note 54.

69.

Id.

70.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, supra
note 57, at 116.

71.

Id. at 140, 144.

72.

See id. at 142–43.

73.

G.A. Res 69/118, supra note 32, ¶ 7.

74.

See Int’l Law Comm’n, 66th Sess., 3227th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.3227 (July 18, 2014).

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

About the Commission, supra note 54.
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rapporteurs typically prepare reports each year to further the work plan
on the topic, explain the state of the law and make proposals for draft
articles.
Consistent with that role, in this topic as well, the Special
Rapporteur prepared three reports for each of 2015, 2016 and 2017. 78
The reports would be circulated to the members just before arrival in
the Swiss city of Geneva each summer, and following their introduction
by the rapporteur, they would be debated by the members of the
Commission in the plenary. 79 After the debate closes, signified by the
summing up by the special rapporteur, the proposed draft articles
contained in each report would be transmitted to the Drafting
Committee. 80 In the drafting process, the members of the Commission
that volunteered to serve on the drafting team for the topic would
engage in a detailed and substantive process of review of every single
paragraph, sentence, and comma. 81 Issues of substance are also
discussed, with the chair of the drafting committee and special
rapporteur playing important roles, in plenty of informal discussions
and negotiations to find a consensus. 82 Once the articles are completed,
they are reported back to the Plenary of the Commission, where they
are adopted. 83 The Commission would approve and subsequently
include them in its annual report for onward transmission to the
General Assembly where States get the opportunity to comment on

78.

Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62; Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur
on Crimes Against Humanity), Second Rep. on Crimes Against
Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/690 (Jan. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Murphy,
Second Rep.]; Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against
Humanity), Third Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/704 (Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Murphy, Third Rep.].

79.

Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62; Murphy, Second Rep., supra note 78;
Murphy, Third Rep., supra note 78.

80.

About the Commission, supra note 54.

81.

See id.

82.

See id.

83.

See, e.g., Mathias Forteau, Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the
International Law Commission, Statement on Crimes Against Humanity
(June
5,
2015),
https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/statemen
ts/2015_dc_chairman_statement_crimes_against_humanity.pdf&lang
=EF [https://perma.cc/VHQ6-HYTS] (reporting on the first draft of the
Convention on Crimes Against Humanity and requesting the plenary to
adopt the draft).
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them in the Sixth (Legal) Committee. 84 The draft articles would
typically be accompanied by commentaries explaining the text.
At the Sixty-Ninth Session in 2017, that is, just four years after the
project began, the Commission successfully adopted a complete set of
draft articles on crimes against humanity. 85 The first reading package
contained a preamble, 15 draft articles, and a draft annex, all of which
were accompanied by draft commentary. 86 These were transmitted to
States, through the Secretary-General, with a request inviting written
comments from States by December 1, 2018. 87

III. Positive Aspects to the ILC’s First Draft
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Humanity
A. An Opportunity to Prepare a Draft Convention for the General
Assembly

Before I highlight the substance of the draft articles, as adopted by
the Commission upon first reading in August of 2017, it seems
noteworthy that the crimes against humanity project is important both
for the ILC and the international community. First, and though
perhaps the least important reason is that for the ILC, which has in
the past been criticized for its deliberative—or should I say too
deliberative—pace of work, the completion of the first reading of the
draft articles on crimes against humanity stands as a major
accomplishment. All the more so given the relatively short period
between the addition of the topic to its program of work in the summer
of 2014, the appointment of a Special Rapporteur the same year, and
the completion of the first reading with a full set of draft articles with
commentary in the summer of 2017. 88 The credit for this lightning
speed, in ILC terms, must go to the Commission as a whole. But it
would not have been possible without a dedicated Special Rapporteur,
as well as an engaged and cooperative Drafting Committee and

84.

See Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of
the General Assembly During Its Seventieth Session, Prepared by the
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/689, at 8-10 (Jan. 28, 2016).

85.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 10–21.

86.

Id. at 9–10.

87.

Id. at 10.

88.

Id.
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Commission. 89 The significance of this point should not be
underestimated as it in some respects confirms – contrary to external
criticisms of the Commission in the 1980s – that the ILC is capable of
taking up a new topic and turning around a rigorous first draft
instrument within a relatively short time frame. Second, the crimes
against humanity project can also be seen as important to the ILC; for
it is, at present, the only topic whereby the Commission has explicitly
declared, from day one in the Syllabus for the topic, that it will be
working in the most traditional or classical part of its mandate, 90 that
being to prepare legal texts, for the General Assembly, which have the
potential, or capacity, to become treaties. 91 This too is important
because many of the ILC’s more recent projects have softer forms such
as draft conclusions and draft guidelines. The seeming shift towards the
preparation of other types of instruments does not mean that the
Commission will neglect its primary function to assist also with the
codification of international law through the proposal of draft articles
capable of creating binding legal obligations for States. In this regard,
the Crimes against Humanity draft will soon join the 2016 draft articles
on protection of persons in the event of disasters text which was the
most recently adopted on second reading during the ILC’s sixth-eight
session and recommended to the General Assembly for the elaboration
as a convention. 92
B.

The ILC’s “Composite” Approach to its Mandate and Application to
Crimes against Humanity

In accordance with Article 1 of its Statute, the Commission has as
its object the “promotion of the progressive development of
international law” and its “codification.” 93 The terms “codification” and
“progressive development” are defined, albeit merely for convenience,
in Article 15 of the Statute of the Commission. 94 Article 15 states that
“progressive development of international law” is a reference to the
89.

See Aniruddha Rajput, Chairman of the Drafting Committee on Crimes
Against Humanity of the International Law Commission, Statement on
Crimes
Against
Humanity
(June
1,
2017),
https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/statemen
ts/2017_dc_chairman_statement_cah.pdf&amp;lang=E
[https://perma.cc/AZ85-SXRH].

90.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, supra
note 57, at Annex B.

91.

Id. ¶¶ 14–16.

92.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/71/10, at 12-13 (2016).

93.

G.A. Res. 174 (II), supra note 40, art. 1.

94.

Id. art. 15.
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“preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not
yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States.” 95 In contrast,
“codification of international law” is said to mean “the more precise
formulation and systematization of rules of international law in fields
where there has already been extensive State practice, precedent and
doctrine.” 96
As a matter of principle, regarding this distinction in its founding
instrument, the ILC has adopted a “composite” approach to its
mandate. 97 Thus, though seemingly formally bound to a division
between progressive development and codification under Article 15 of
its statute, the Commission has preferred to present legal texts that
may reflect a mix of both. 98 This is because, in practice and drawing on
the experience with prior codification efforts tracing back to the preILC League of Nations period, the Commission found that it is near
impossible to separate the two sets of tasks which were essentially
intertwined, inter-related, and indivisible. For that reason, as a general
rule, the ILC has not flagged which of its provisions contained in texts
forwarded to the General Assembly constitute one or the other. 99 It has
done so in a relatively small set instances over a seventy-year period.
It would, when it speaks to the point, often be content to state, at the
outset, that the text in the package being sent to States should be
presumed to include a mixture of both codification and progressive
development. 100 This approach seemed to generally work well. It also
seems more protective of States law-making role since they would then,
irrespective of the ILC classification of text as codification or
progressive development, go on to negotiate a treaty text based on the
Commission’s work. The ability to (re)negotiate, on the basis of the
texts, binding conventions ensures a balance can be struck by the States
themselves between the aspects that may reflect codification and those
that may constitute progressive development. This might include a
95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Charles C. Jalloh, The Role and Contributions of the International Law
Commission to the Development of International Law, 13 F.I.U. L. REV.
975, 979 (2019); Dire Tladi, The International Law Commission’s Recent
Work on Exceptions to Immunity: Charting the Course for a Brave New
World in International Law?, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2019).

98.

See Jalloh, supra note 97.

99.

Tladi, supra note 97, at 182.

100. See, e.g., Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, in
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third session, U.N.
Doc. A/66/10, at 222 (2011); Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 19 (2008).
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refinement, revision, consolidation or even development of the
substantive law, as has happened in some cases with draft ILC texts
prepared for the General Assembly including the 1994 draft Statute for
a permanent international criminal court, a function that is obviously
the legitimate purview of States as legislators of the law that bind them
rather than the task of ILC members. The question that might now
arise is whether this established practice should continue given the
increasing tendency of the ILC’s current projects to be of a softer nature
in the form of draft principles, guidelines, or conclusions rather than
draft articles designed for possible transformation into multilateral
conventions negotiated by States.
Some aspects of the ILC’s first reading draft crimes against
humanity treaty appear to go beyond codification of the existing
customary law of crimes against humanity and may reflect its
progressive development. Indeed, the fact that the Commission
embarked upon the path of preparing draft articles for the crimes
against humanity topic does not mean that the work on this or any of
its other projects could be regarded as limited to codification of the
existing law. Pure codification tasks will, in methodological terms,
entail an in-depth assessment of the customary law status of each given
rule. That would in turn call for a detailed examination of whether
there exists a general practice among States that is accepted as law in
relation to a given rule. A second step would then determine whether
the rule needs to be improved even as it is reduced into writing as part
of the exercise of codification within the meaning of Article 15 of the
ILC Statute. Even in the task of codification, it can be presumed to
include minor changes or additions to clarify issues or fix gaps. As
Professor Brierly explained well in the expert committee discussions
preceding the creation of the ILC in relevant part:
…codification cannot be absolutely limited to declaring existing
law. As soon as you set out to do this, you discover that the
existing law is uncertain, that for one reason or another there are
gaps in it which are not covered. If you were to disregard these
uncertainties and these gaps and simply include in your code,
rules of existing law which are absolutely clear and certain, the
work would have little value. Hence, the codifier, if he is
competent for his work, will make suggestions of his own; where
the rule is uncertain, he will suggest which is the better view;
where a gap exists, he will suggest how it can best be filled. If he
makes it clear what he is doing, tabulates the existing authorities,
fairly examines the arguments pro and con, he will be doing his
work properly. But it is true that in this aspect of his work he
will be suggesting legislation—he will be working on the lex
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ferenda, not the lex lata—he will be extending the law and not
merely stating the law that already exists. 101

There are, of course, other aspects of the draft convention that
constitute “progressive development,” as the phrase is understood in
Article 15 of the Statute of the Commission. 102 The latter provides for
the preparation of draft conventions on subjects that have either not
yet been regulated or encompasses situations where the law itself has
not been sufficiently developed in State practice. 103 The description of
some provisions contained in the first reading text of crimes against
humanity might fit the progressive development category. 104 The
extension of rules on extradition and mutual legal assistance specifically
to crimes against humanity could be illustrations of this. 105
Yet, there is extensive practice of States in that regard in relation
to several other (transnational) crimes. 106 In fact, this example suggests
that the distinction between codification and progressive development
is to some extent facile, in the sense that both concepts mandated in
Article 15 of the Commission’s statute admit of a measure of change to
a given rule whether framed as codification or progressive
development. 107 In the present example, all that takes place is that the
existing rule which is known in the transnational crimes context is
extended to cover a new situation addressing atrocity crimes. 108 If that
contention is true, the question might arise whether this approach was
sound for this specific topic. I would argue that it is for several reasons.

101. HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 135 (1969).
102. Hannes Jöbstl, An Unforeseen Pandora’s Box? Absolute NonRefoulement Obligations Under Article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles on
Crimes
Against
Humanity, EJIL: TALK! (May 5, 2019),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/category/international-criminal-law/crimesagainst-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/JJ69-N542].
103. G.A. Res. 174 (II), supra note 40, art. 15.
104. See Jöbstl, supra note 102.
105. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 15–17.
106. See, e.g., U.N. OFF. OF DRUGS & CRIME, Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA),
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-11/keyissues/mutual-legal-assistance.html [https://perma.cc/7KFW-7UGT].
107. See Sean D. Murphy, Codification, Progressive Development, or Scholarly
Analysis? The Art of Packaging the ILC’s Work Product, GEO. WASH. L.
(Oct.
27,
2012),
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1915&amp;
context=faculty_publications [https://perma.cc/GWS4-6WN5].
108. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 15–17.
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First, given the nature of the subject matter, especially the gravity
of the crimes under consideration. A related point, already mentioned
above, is the virtually inseparable nature of the task of codification
from the task of progressive development. 109
Second, although there is some practice to investigate and
prosecute these crimes within international tribunals such as the ICTY,
the ICTR, the SCSL, and the ICC, there is relatively more limited State
practice concerning the investigation and prosecution of such crimes at
the national level and within national courts. 110 Yet, at least indirectly,
the practice of international courts set up to prosecute crimes against
humanity would be relevant, 111 more so where the law in this area has
been developed by the judges of those courts without objection from
States.
Third, and relatedly, since the ILC crimes against humanity project
was partly justified as a gap filling convention, there is, ultimately, a
need for an effective regime at the national level for the prevention and
punishment of crimes against humanity. 112 This apparently requires a
study of treaties which are highly developed in respect of transnational
crimes. Those treaties, which contain rules reflecting codification and
those that reflect progressive development, may offer useful models for
crimes against humanity. In such circumstances, rather than emphasize
which aspect of its draft articles constitute progressive development
and which reflect codification of existing law, the Commission
necessarily blends the two to advance draft articles deemed to be useful,
effective, and likely to find acceptance among a broad range of States.113
This would include parties or non-parties to the ICC Statute.
In a nutshell, both for principled and pragmatic reasons, the draft
crimes against humanity articles adopted on first reading in 2017
conform to the long-standing practice of the Commission. 114 As the
study itself aims at producing a draft convention, which contains
elements of existing law and elements of proposals for progressive
development of the law, the Commission enjoys some freedom to
suggest provisions based primarily on whether they are expected to be
109. Murphy, Codification, Progressive Development, or Scholarly Analysis?,
supra note 107, at 2.
110. See Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 15, 18, 25, 31.
111. Rep. on Seventieth Session, supra note 12, at 130–31.
112. See Anturo J. Carrillo & Annalise Nelson, Comparative Law Study and
Analysis of National Legislation Relating to Crimes Against Humanity
and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.R. 481, 482
(2014).
113. See Jalloh, supra note 97.
114. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 9-10.
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useful and effective in the prohibition and punishment of crimes against
humanity. 115 Thus, it seems plausible that some of the provisions will
go beyond existing law, that is to say, beyond codification as defined
under the Statute. The safeguard for States is that, if they take forward
the draft convention, they would negotiate the text and make it their
own irrespective whether some of the proposed provisions are
restatements of customary law and others amount to progressive
development. Once satisfied, they can through signature, ratification
and accession express their consent to be bound by the obligations
contained within it. In such circumstances, where the guding
consideration will be on whether they are establishing a workable legal
regime to prohibit and punish crimes against humanity, it seems not as
material for each specific draft article to reflect the lex lata.
With the above context in mind, let us now proceed to assess the
form and substance of the ILC’s draft crimes against humanity articles
adopted by the Commission on first reading in 2017. Two brief
observations seem warranted. First, the first draft crimes against
humanity convention consists of a preamble, 15 draft articles, and a
draft annex, all of which are accompanied by commentary. 116 Though
perhaps an unfair comparison, this is a much shorter and more compact
instrument, compared to the 19 clauses of the 1948 Genocide
Convention and between the 63 and 163 clauses and several annexes of
the four separate Geneva Conventions. 117
Second, and focusing on substance, even a cursory review would
show that the draft crimes against humanity articles reflect many
benefits of having a standalone treaty. It compares favorably, and in
nearly all respects, improves upon the Geneva and Genocide
Convention frameworks. The duty to prevent and the duty to punish
are both given great weight. 118 The draft convention also contemplates
strong mini-extradition and mutual legal assistance regimes that are
missing from the war crimes and genocide conventions. 119 For the latter
reason, it would have been beneficial for the Commission to broaden
the crimes against humanity project to also include war crimes and
genocide in its study.

115. See Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 7, 8.
116. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 10.
117. Genocide Convention, supra note 60; Geneva I, supra note 60; Geneva IV,
supra note 60.
118. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 11–13.
119. Id. at 15–17.
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C.

Draft Article 1—Scope of the Draft Articles

Besides the preambular paragraphs, which among other things
recognize that the prohibition of crimes against humanity is a
peremptory norm of general international law and that it is the duty of
States to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over the crime, this opening
provision, which is standard in ILC draft texts, sets the stage for the
whole project. It provides that “[t]he present draft articles apply to the
prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity.” 120 The thrust
looks both to the future and to the past. Future in the sense that, by
criminalizing crimes against humanity, it seeks to prevent them from
being committed. 121 In terms of the past, when crimes have been or are
being committed, it seeks to create a mechanism that would require
States to take measures to prevent others who would otherwise carry
them out. 122
Regrettably, although crimes against humanity, genocide, war
crimes and the crime of aggression are typically committed together,
the draft instrument does not encompass those other grave crimes.123
To have covered war crimes and genocide would have broadened the
scope of the ILC’s project. Nonetheless, it would have better addressed
the realities of international crimes by providing a regime for horizontal
cooperation on extradition and mutual legal assistance than solely
addressing the single crime. Incidentally, although the ILC decided to
limit its work to only crimes against humanity, several States have
initiated a separate project that would encompass at least three of the
four core crimes under international law. 124
D.

Draft Article 2—General Obligation

Article 2 essentially provides that States undertake both to prevent
and to punish crimes against humanity, which are crimes under
international law, whether committed in peace time or during
wartime. 125 The first part of the provision can be said to constitute
codification. 126 The ILC had, in some of its prior work, concluded that
crimes against humanity were clearly prohibited as a crime under
120. Id. at 10.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 11.
124. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session,
supra note 35, at 110.
125. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 85, at 11.
126. See id.
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international law since there is an extensive body of State practice
prohibiting the crime dating back to at least 1945. 127 The latter
obligation in Article 2, which entails the element of prevention of crimes
against humanity, may constitute progressive development even if it
logically follows from the ambition of punishment. 128
In advancing this provision, the Special Rapporteur provided
multiple treaty references including the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1950 Principles
of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg
Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal, 1954 Draft Code of
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1968 Convention
on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and
crimes against humanity, and others. 129 Although, none of those
instruments included the exact language of Article 2, the Special
Rapporteur emphasized that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, with 150 State signatories,
as a similar convention which represents that States bear an obligation
to prosecute and prevent these crimes of atrocity which are punishable
during times of armed conflict, and times of peace. 130 The Genocide
Convention, which contains the duty of prevention in relation to that
crime, is usually considered to be part of customary international law.131
As a crime analogous to a crime against humanity, and considering the
subsequent developments in international criminal law since 1948, an
extension of this obligation to cover this crime is warranted. 132
The text of the preventative part of the provision seems well
anchored by its alignment with the analogous obligation set forth in
Article 1 133 of the 1948 Genocide Convention via use of the words
“undertake to” rather than “shall,” and identifies crimes against
humanity as “crimes under international law,” an expression previously
used by the ILC, for example in Article 1, paragraph 2 of the 1996 Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 134 The
assertion in this draft article that crimes against humanity are crimes
127. Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 20.
128. Forteau, supra note 83, at 3–5.
129. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 26–27, 30, 45.
130. Id. at 45.
131. Genocide, U.N. OFF. ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION AND THE RESP. TO
PROTECT,
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml
[https://perma.cc/6L2A-EG7Q].
132. Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 6–7.
133. Genocide Convention, supra note 60, at 280.
134. Peace and Security, supra note 30, at 17.
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under international law affirms the prohibition of crimes against
humanity exists, even if not included in national law. The aspect
concerning “whether or not committed in time of armed conflict” 135 is
also important due, firstly, to the long debate among international
criminal lawyers about the so-called conflict nexus, and secondly, the
fact that the origins of the crime in an international armed conflict
(World War II) does not mean it has not been recognized as also
prohibited in the context of internal armed conflicts under customary
law. As explained by the Chairperson of the Drafting Committee in
relation to the conflict nexus which is now settled:
The Drafting Committee considered it important to maintain this
element from the original proposal by the Special Rapporteur in
view of the historic evolution of the definition of crimes against
humanity. As explained in the First Report, these crimes were
originally linked to the existence of an armed conflict in the
context of the Nürnberg Tribunal. Customary international law
has developed since then, and it is now firmly established that no
such connection is required. 136 [Emphasis added].

The important duty to prevent crimes against humanity is further
explained in the Commission’s commentary, and was also addressed in
later substantive provisions of the draft articles. 137 Unresolved issues
concerning this provision will include the scope and depth of the duty
of prevention, in particular, whether it applies only internally in the
concerned State or also externally in relation to other States.138
Consideration of this will presumably account for the more recent
developments concerning the responsibility to protect which was
endorsed in relation to crimes against humanity by the UN General
Assembly in 2005. 139 The duty to prevent, as important as it is, would
seem to be implicit in the prohibition of crimes against humanity but
may be a form of progressive development.

135. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 11; Forteau, supra note 83, at 5.
136. Forteau, supra note 83, at 5.
137. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 25–28.
138. See William A. Schabas, Prevention of Crimes Against Humanity, 16 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 705, 714-21 (2018) (discussing the background and
various interpretations of prevention provisions throughout the history of
the ILC).
139. G.A. Res. 60/1, at 30 (Sept. 16, 2005).
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E.

Draft Article 3—Definition of Crimes against Humanity

The first reading crimes against humanity text also provides, in
four paragraphs, a single definition of crimes against humanity. 140 This
should help develop the type of definitional coherence we see for the
crime of genocide and war crimes but that has been abjectly missing
for crimes against humanity. 141 In terms of origin, the first three
paragraphs of this article essentially reproduced Article 7 of the Rome
Statute, which incidentally, did not purport to reflect the customary
international law definition of crimes against humanity when the treaty
was negotiated in 1998. 142 The preference for the ICC definition stems
from the view within the Commission, both in Plenary and Drafting
Committee, that the crimes against humanity definition in the Rome
Statute should not be altered for the purposes of the draft articles.143
This approach, which also apparently reflected the preference of some
States Parties to the Rome Statute in the General Assembly, seemed
uncontroversial within the Commission and was a pragmatic choice
that was also stressed in the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the
first reading text recalling the ICC definition. 144
At the same time, though the Commission’s settled methodology in
preparation of draft articles is a more integrated approach, the adoption
of Article 7 should have provoked a more robust discussion. This might
have included consideration of whether the definitional provision was a
codification or progressive development of international criminal law,
especially given the differing definitions of this crime since the
Nuremberg Tribunal. The discussion would be important because the
definition of the crime has potentially far reaching implications about
the scope of the prohibition and therefore the reach of the crime. There
are also diverging views among jurists on the customary law status of
the Rome Statute definition, with most authorities and ad hoc courts
concluding that the ICC Statute is much narrower than customary
international law. 145 The difficulty was implicitly recognized. Thus,
although only directed at definitions found in national legislation and
140. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 11–12.
141. See id. at 21.
142. Id. at 29.
143. Forteau, supra note 83, at 6.
144. See Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 57–58.
145. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 373
(Cassese, Gaeta & Jones, eds., 2002) (arguing that “In some respects,
Article 7 elaborates and clarifies customary international law. In other
respects, it is more narrow than customary international law.”).
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in other international instruments, the Commission included a savings
clause in paragraph 4 to the borrowed definition from Article 7 of the
ICC Statute. 146 That fourth paragraph clarifies that the draft article is
without prejudice to any broader definition of crimes against humanity
provided in any international instrument or national law. 147
This without prejudice clause also allowed the ILC to set aside
potentially positive developments in the definition of crimes against
humanity since the Rome Statute was adopted in July 1998, in relation
to for example, the subset crime of enforced disappearance that now
has a standalone treaty concluded in 2006. The issue was explained as
follows:
[T]he definition adopted for these draft articles has no effect upon
broader definitions that may exist currently in other instruments,
such as the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, or in national laws . .
. [and which] also makes clear that the present draft articles have
no effect on the adoption, in the future, of a broader definition of
crimes against humanity in an international instrument or a
national law. 148

Interestingly, although there were references to definitions of crimes
against humanity under national law or other international
instruments, the without prejudice clause was virtually silent regarding
customary international law. 149 That omission was surprising
considering that custom is one of the most important sources of law
with serious implications for national jurisdictions and their prohibition
of crimes against humanity. 150 It is even more surprising since the
Commission was simultaneously also undertaking a separate study on
identification of customary international law. 151 In States that would
have incorporated the crime, through national legislation, the
prosecution of the crime would be possible as paragraph 4 captured
their scenario. 152 For those States that have the possibility of doing so
146. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 44–45.
147. Id.
148. Forteau, supra note 83, at 6.
149. See id. at 6-7.
150. See Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 7.
151. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 192–93.
152. See Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity),
Fourth Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/725, at 3738 (Feb. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Murphy, Fourth Rep.].
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under customary law, without first having passed legislation, the
omission in the without prejudice clause of customary law would pose
some legal difficulties. The ILC will presumably revisit this aspect
during the second reading on the topic.
There is a further concern about the ILC definition that is more
forward-looking than backward-looking. What the Commission does
should not in any way inhibit the growth of the customary law of crimes
against humanity. 153 Ironically, even the ICC Statute, from which the
ILC crimes against humanity definition is borrowed, two points make
the intention of States not to disturb customary law crystal clear. First,
the opening formulation of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, uses the
language of “for the purpose of this Statute”. 154 This phrase was
included to avoid any doubts about the specific crimes against
humanity definition in the context of the establishment of a permanent
ICC. 155
Second, in Article 10 of the ICC Statute, States were unequivocal
that their preference for a particular definition of crimes against
humanity for the specific purposes of the Rome Statute was not to be
interpreted “as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing
rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute”,
meaning outside the ICC context. 156 The ILC took note of Article 10 in
its commentary to Article 3 but could also have taken on board
developments in international law since the Rome Statute was
negotiated in July 1998. 157 Elements of the definition of the crime, for
example in relation to enforced disappearances as a crime against
humanity, has since been phrased in a way that is much broader than
the definition actually included in Article 7, paragraph 2(i), of the Rome
Statute in Article 2 of the 2006 International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons against Enforced Disappearance. 158
We shall return to these and related concerns about the use of the
ICC definition in Part IV of the present article. For now, it can be
concluded that the definition of crimes against humanity contained in
the first reading text is closer to an exercise in codification rather than
153. See G.A. Res. 174 (II), supra note 40, art. 1; Leila Nadya Sadat, Custom,
Codification and Some Thoughts About the Relationship Between the
Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 910–11
(2000).
154. Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 7.
155. See id.
156. See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 10; see also Sadat, supra note 153,
at 910–11.
157. See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 125.
158. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006, 2176 U.N.T.S. 3 (the article 2
“enforced disappearance”).
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progressive development – to the extent that most (though not all) of
the elements contained in the Rome Statute definition would appear to
be part of customary international law.
F.

Draft Article 4—Obligation of Prevention

One of the most important features of the first reading text is the
duty to prevent crimes against humanity. Draft Article 4, composed of
two paragraphs, provides one of the most significant advances when it
requires that each State undertakes to prevent crimes against
humanity, in conformity with international law, through the adoption
of various measures in any territory under its jurisdiction. It would
establish an independent duty, from that of the duty to punish, to
prevent crimes against humanity including mandating States to
affirmatively adopt “effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other preventive measure in any territory under its jurisdiction” and
“cooperate with other States, relevant intergovernmental organizations
and, as appropriate, other organizations” to prevent crimes against
humanity.
The ILC Article 4 complements Article 2 and makes the case why
certain acts, which qualify as crimes against humanity, already require
States to engage in proactive measures of prevention. The comparison
was made to certain other widely condemned crimes such as genocide,
apartheid, enforced disappearances, and torture. The prohibition of
those crimes requires States to take preventive measures. By parity of
reasoning, even if the obligation did not exist in relation to all the acts
that comprise crimes against humanity, it was felt necessary to extend
it to also cover such crimes since all of those crimes are themselves
crimes against humanity when committed in the context of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population. Here,
a strict line dividing codification from progressive development might
have required separating the three underlying acts for which there are
independent treaties to the extent that those could be said to constitute
customary law (i.e. torture, enforced disappearances and apartheid)
from the rest of the eight others that constitute crimes against
humanity (i.e. murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, rape, persecution, other inhumane acts).
Most of the rest of these crimes, for instance, murder, enslavement,
imprisonment, rape and persecution are so prevalent in virtually all
States that it will be hard for them not to constitute forms of
codification even if one might have to fill a gap to derive the duty to
prevent them in addition to the duty to punish. The autonomous duty
to prevent crimes against humanity is also consistent with the practice
of States in concluding numerous largely suppression treaties, especially
since the 1960s, that feature a duty to take steps to prevent particular
crimes such as terrorism, human trafficking and hostage taking.
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To justify the argument for prevention, reliance was also placed on
multilateral human rights treaties establishing obligations to prevent
human rights violations though it was recognized that these were not
necessarily penal in nature. Reference was also made to the
jurisprudence of international courts, most notably, the International
Court of Justice which has found the duty to prevent and the duty to
punish are distinct but connected obligations. 159 All would support the
commonsense position that, like the case for genocide, States can be
asked to undertake the duty to prevent crimes against humanity. In
the commentary, the Commission went on to explain what exactly
prevention would entail. Here, it relied on a four-part duty for States
based on the ICJ judgment in relation to Genocide which was viewed
as naturally extending to crimes against humanity. 160 The ICJ, as part
of this, reasoned that the duty to prevent genocide is not necessarily
territorially limited, meaning that the similar duty could apply to
crimes against humanity in areas under both de facto and de jure
control of the State concerned. 161
As framed, this provision would require States to develop
mechanisms which they may use to promote the prevention of crimes
against humanity. 162 The majority of the language for Article 4 (1) (a)
and the commentary concerning the treatment of the duty to prevent
crimes against humanity broadly followed and applied to this crime
derive from the findings of the ICJ in relation to the interpretation of
this same obligation under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention in the
Bosnia Genocide Case. The obligation of prevention being placed on
States is important and would be read in light of the circumstances and
the risks they are being confronted with at the time as well as their
capacity to influence the course of events. 163 Measures taken, of course,
must remain in full conformity with international law. 164 In other words,
a State may not violate international law and unlawfully use force in
the name of preventing crimes against humanity. 165
The duty to take preventive measures could be seen as a form of
codification, or perhaps more plausibly, as a form of progressive
development. The Commission, without drawing such a distinction,
159. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro),
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 42, ¶¶ 430–431 (Feb. 26).
160. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra
note 35, at 49–51, 54.
161. Id. at 53–54.
162. Id. at 51.
163. Rep. on Sixty-Seventh Session, supra note 11, at 53.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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essentially derived the obligation to prevent from a combined reading
of State practice, jurisprudence and the established prohibition
providing for punishment of those who commit crimes against
humanity. This in a way represents the consolidation of a body of law
on crimes against humanity that first emerged in the immediate
aftermath of World War II and that extends through to the modern
period with the establishment of the UN international tribunals as well
as various prosecutions of the crime within national courts. Yet, in
many ways, the categorization of the draft article may not be as
significant. This is because, as with the case of the Genocide
Convention, there is no automatic extension of the obligation of
prevention onto States until a convention containing this express
obligation is adopted. The safeguard for States remains in that they
would have to choose to negotiate and then join such a convention and
to give their consent in relation to the duty to prevent before it would
apply to them from the point of entry into force. 166
Paragraph two of the draft article forecloses any exceptional
circumstances as justifications for the crime. 167 This paragraph was
inspired by but is not entirely identical with article 2, paragraph 2 of
the Convention against Torture. 168 The provision was naturally tweaked
to better fit the crimes against humanity context. As the Chair of the
Drafting Committee explained, “it was thought that an advantage of
this formulation with respect to crimes against humanity is that it is
drafted in a manner that can speak to the conduct of either State or
non-State actors.” 169
G.

Draft Article 5—Non-Refoulement

Draft Article 5, which is in some respects also preventive,
contemplates in paragraph 1 that no person is to be expelled, returned
(refoulér), surrendered or extradited to a State to “territory under the
jurisdiction of another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to a
crime against humanity.” 170 This language is largely derived from the
2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance. But the textual addition of “territory under”
has the effect of narrowing down the version included in the draft crimes
166. United Nations, Towards Universal Participation and Implementation
2011
Treaty
Event,
available
at:
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2011/Press_kit/fact_sheet_1
_english.pdf [perma: https://perma.cc/KN9V-Z3AE].
167. Rep. on Sixty-Seventh Session, supra note 11, at 53.
168. Id.
169. Forteau, supra note 83.
170. Rep. on Sixty-Ninth Session, supra note 35, at 12.
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against humanity text. 171 The focus should be on the change of
jurisdiction which is not necessarily coextensive with territory.
The second paragraph of Draft Article 5 requires States to examine
factors triggerring non-refoulement; such grounds are broad and would
require taking into account “all relevant considerations, including,
where applicable, the existence in the territory under the jurisdiction
of the State concern of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights or of serious violations of international
humanitarian law.” 172 This clause, or close variants of it, has previously
been included in a number of international and regional treaties
including: the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and
the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 173 Nonetheless, and appropriately
so in my view, no exceptions to the prohibition of non-refoulement
similar to that found in refugee law allowing the return of a refugee
who has committed a particularly serious crime or deemed to be a
national security risk was incorporated in the context of crimes against
humanity. 174
A wider formulation of this duty was already included in the
Commission’s own project on diplomatic protection. 175 The use of
certain limiting language, concerning the formula regarding the
“territory under the jurisdiction of” raises a number of concerns that
might merit revisiting during the second reading stage. A related issue
is whether, if a person is in danger of crimes against humanity, the
obligation should be limited to assessing only that risk. Surely, it would
be more consistent with the letter and spirit of the provision if the
States concerned are required to assess the potential risk also in relation
to other crimes. It is unclear whether the individual can be deported to
a situation where other international crimes, such as war crimes or
genocide or even other non-criminal gross human rights violations, are
being committed. In the end, given that most of Draft Article 5 matches
existing law and is found in numerous treaties and other instruments
already widely accepted by States, it can be seen as a codification of an
existing and fundamental rule of international law that prohibits

171. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, supra note 158, art. 9(1)(a).
172. Rep. on Sixty-Ninth Session, supra note 35, at 12.
173. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 86.
174. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 173.
175. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 31, at 17.
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against refoulement. The rule is even sometimes said to possess a jus
cogens character. 176
H.

Draft Article 6—Criminalization under National Law

Draft Article 6 requires States to take measures to ensure that
crimes against humanity are criminalized under their national law,
which – if followed – would do much to prevent crimes against
humanity from occurring. 177 This draft article, which seems like a mix
of codification and progressive development, further obliges States to
address in their national laws the liability of others as well: for various
modes of liability, including committing, attempting, ordering; to
provide for command or superior responsibility; and provide
appropriate penalties for the gravity of the crimes; the liability of legal
persons; while providing that liability would follow despite official
position of a person, which would not serve to exclude the person from
criminal responsibility and affirming the inapplicability of a statute of
limitations and the superior orders defense for such crimes. 178
Specifically, given divergent definitions of the crime in national
laws, draft article 6 is significant in mandating that States take the
necessary measures to ensure that crimes against humanity are
criminalized under their national law as such, and equally importantly,
that they ensure that such measures cannot be defeated by pleas to
procedural bars that might otherwise gut the essence of the
prohibition. 179 The Special Rapporteur believed that State practice
regarding the liability of legal persons for the offences referred to in the
draft articles was varied. 180 The idea of corporate criminal liability for
crimes against humanity and other atrocity crimes was mooted but was
not taken forward during the 1998 negotiations of the Rome Statute.
More recently, in the African Union, African States adopted the Malabo
Protocol providing for the criminal liability of legal persons.181
Interestingly, the provision contemplates the application of such

176. Id. at 22.
177. Rep. on Sixty-Ninth Session, supra note 35, at 13.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Int’l Law Comm’n, Provisional summary record of the 3296th mtg., Sixtyeighth session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3296, at 9 (2016).
181. See article 46, African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted
by the Twenty-third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government, 27 June 2014 (15 signatories as of this writing but not
yet in force).
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liability for both transnational 182 crimes and crimes against humanity
as well as a longer list of international crimes than the four contained
in the ICC Statute. 183
However, even if that practice varies and could be insufficient to
reach the threshold of codification, several members of the Commission
highlighted the need for a provision requiring the establishment of
liability of legal persons for crimes against humanity. 184 There was
considerable support in the Plenary discussions of the Commission for
the inclusion of a provision of this kind, to account for new realities of
legal persons being accomplices or aiders and abettors to the
commission of mass violations of human rights, and in some cases, even
crimes against humanity. 185 There are no doubt various parts of this
provision that are forms of progressive development. There are also
other parts, especially the modes of liability, that may already have
sufficient rooting in customary international law. 186
It is regrettable that the ILC, though relying on the individual
criminal responsibility clause set out in Article 25(3) of the Rome
Statute for inspiration, did not include other established modes of
liability such as inciting/incitement and conspiracy, for crimes against
humanity, both of which are found in its own prior and well-known
work on the Draft Code of Crimes and in the Genocide Convention.187
Incitement as a form of accessorial liability seems well rooted in
customary international law. 188 It is a vital form of criminal

182. The distinction between international and transnational crimes is, of
course, not always clear. See Charles C. Jalloh, “The Distinction Between
“International” and “Transnational” Crimes in the African Criminal
Court”, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES, 272 (Harmen Van der Wilt & Christophe Paulussen eds., 2017).
183. THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS:
DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES (Charles Jalloh, Kamari Clarke &
Vincent Nmehielle eds., 2019). See, in particular, Chapter 27 on Article
46C by Joanna Kyriakakis.
184. Int’l Law Comm’n, Provisional summary record of the 3300th mtg., Sixtyeighth session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3300, at 14 (2016).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 3.
187. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, art.
III(b)-(c), Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
188. See TERJE EINARSEN & JOSEPH RIKHOF, A THEORY OF PUNISHABLE
PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSAL CRIMES (2018) 257-304 (providing a
thoughtful critique pointing out inconsistencies in the ILC’s approach to
modes of liability including in relation to the crimes against humanity
project).

366

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
The International Law Commission’s First Draft Convention on Crimes
Against Humanity

participation in relation to genocide, 189 and given the systemic nature
of such core crimes, also in relation to crimes against humanity. 190 This
mode of criminal participation is reflected in extensive State practice
and in the practice of international criminal courts that have prosecuted
crimes against humanity. 191 Interestingly, the ILC departs from its
earlier work by omitting both incitement and conspiracy from the draft
crimes against humanity articles.
I.

Draft Article 7—Establishment of National Jurisdiction

Draft article 7 addresses the obligation of States to establish
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity in certain circumstances. It
provides, in relevant part, that “[e]ach State shall take the necessary
measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered by the
present draft articles . . . .” 192 Its three subsections delineate the
circumstances under which States shall take the necessary measures to
establish jurisdiction: territorial jurisdiction, active personality
jurisdiction, and passive personality jurisdiction. 193 In order to properly
appreciate this draft article, the contents must be explained prior to
the analysis. Though it can already be said that the bulk of this would
appear to be a form of codification even if there are also aspects that
could be read as progressive development.
First, territorial jurisdiction is based on the location of the crime.
This subsection provides a basis to assert territorial jurisdiction “when
the offence is committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on
board a ship or aircraft registered in that State.” 194
Second, active personality jurisdiction is a common form of
jurisdiction in national law based on the nationality of the alleged
offender. This subsection provides for the assertion of jurisdiction
“when the alleged offender is a national of that State or, if that State
considers it appropriate, a stateless person who habitually resides in
that State’s territory.” 195
Third, passive personality provides the final basis on which to
assert jurisdiction. Passive personality has been described as
189. See for the pernicious role of incitement in fomenting atrocity crimes,
Gregory S. Gordon, ATROCITY SPEECH LAW: FOUNDATION,
FRAGMENTATION, FRUITION (2017).
190. Id.
191. See generally Wibke Kristin Timmermann, Incitement in international
criminal law, 88 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 164, 823-852 (2006).
192. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 32, ch. IV, art. 7(1)(a).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. art. 7(1)(b).
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controversial by some academics even though it exists in several
national criminal systems. This final subsection provides that
jurisdiction may be asserted “when the victim is a national of that State
. . . .” 196 National law is instrumental regarding this subsection because
it will provide the definition. 197
Moving on to paragraph two of the same draft article, which
provides that: “[e]ach State shall also take necessary measures to
establish jurisdiction over the offences covered by the present draft
articles . . . where the alleged offender is present in any territory under
its jurisdiction and it does not extradite or surrender the person . . .
.” 198 This paragraph, which in some respects is residual in character to
encompass situations not covered by the earlier grounds of jurisdiction,
creates a duty for States to establish such jurisdiction. No prior
territorial or active or passive personality connection to the crime is
required. The provision contemplates situations where a suspect, say in
an attempt to find safe haven, becomes present in a State Party having
no other connections to the offense. However, the draft articles consider
the possibility that a State may extradite or surrender the alleged
offender, which is addressed in greater detail in other draft articles
specifically article 9. 199
Next, the third and final paragraph of article 7 makes clear that
“the exercise of criminal jurisdiction established by a State in
accordance with its national law” is not excluded when using other
jurisdictional grounds that may be available to it. 200 For instance, the
exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of universal jurisdiction for crimes
against humanity would be permissible. The Commission did not
explicitly say anything on this, which might strike the reader as odd
given the widespread acceptance by States of the existence of universal
jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. At the same time, given earlier
ILC work in this regard, it was understood that the omission of the
reference did not constitute a departure from its earlier works on the
subject. 201 Indeed, under Article 8 of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the Commission was clear
that it would be up to States to establish broad forms of jurisdiction
196. Id. art. 7(1)(c).
197. For further comments on article 7, see Antonio Coco, The Universal Duty
to Establish Jurisdiction over and Investigate Crimes Against Humanity:
Preliminary Remarks on Draft Articles 7, 8, 9, and 11 by the International
Law Commission, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 751, 761 (2018).
198. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, Article 7(2).
199. Id. art. 9(1).
200. Id. ch. IV, art. 7(3).
201. See id.
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over atrocity crimes, including crimes against humanity, “irrespective
of where or by whom those crimes were committed.” 202 It can thus be
concluded that the universality principle remains a viable jurisdictional
basis for the investigation and punishment of crimes against humanity.
Since it appears that there is universal criminal jurisdiction for
crimes against humanity under customary international law, consistent
with the views of many States as expressed before the Sixth Committee,
article 7 could be misread as restricting the “combined approach to
jurisdiction based on the broadest jurisdiction of national courts”
envisioned by the ILC in 1996 in commentary paragraph (2) to article
8 of the draft code. 203 Indeed, according to the Commission, “The phrase
“irrespective of where or by whom those crimes were committed” is
used in the first provision of the article to avoid any doubt as to the
existence of universal jurisdiction for those crimes.” 204 Additionally, this
broad concept of universal jurisdiction finds support in international
and domestic law and in other scholarly and other works as evidenced
by, for instance, Principles 1 of both the Princeton Principles and the
Madrid-Buenos Aires Principles of Universal Jurisdiction. 205
J.

Draft Article 8—Investigation

Article 8 mandates that, when there are reasonable grounds to
believe that acts constituting crimes against humanity have been or are
being committed on their territory, the competent authorities of a State
must take measures to ensure a prompt and impartial investigation.206
This approach, of directing the issue of investigation to the States that
may have crimes against humanity occurring in their territory, is in line
with existing international instruments, such as the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment—article 12 of which provides a base for the formulation of

202. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its FortyEighth Session, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, at 110–11, U.N. Doc. A/51/10
(1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 29, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2).
203. Id. at 205.
204. Id. at 29.
205. See The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Princeton
Program
in
Law
and
Public
Policy
(2001)
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/princeton.htm
[https://perma.cc/9KSN-GWR6]l; FIBGAR, International Congress on
Universal Jurisdiction: Dissemination of the Madrid-Buenos Aires
Principles
on
Universal
Jurisdiction
(Sept.
10,
2015),
https://fibgar.org/upload/proyectos/35/en/principles-of-universaljurisdiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT99-CP84].
206. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 8.
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draft article 7. 207 Torture, when committed in a widespread or
systematic context, is a crime against humanity. 208
More expressly, article 8 relates to a States’ obligation to promptly
and impartially investigate offences constituting crimes against
humanity “in any territory under its jurisdiction.” 209 To avoid
unnecessary confusion, it could be explained in the commentary that
the intention was to also encompass situations where there is both de
facto and de jure exercise of such jurisdiction. 210 Undoubtedly, when
crimes against humanity occur, the “competent authorities” of States
have an obligation to proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation.
However, neither the commentary, nor the text, of this draft article
define or explain the term “competent authorities.” 211
Competent authorities may be read narrowly as including only the
law enforcement authorities of a State. It could also be read more
broadly to encompass other types of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies
created by a State to investigate or document atrocity crimes.
Consequently, it would seem beneficial for the commentary to clarify
whether quasi-judicial investigations such as special commissions of
inquiry or truth commissions are encompassed in this draft article.
Further, it may not be entirely clear whether competent authorities are
only the law enforcement bodies, or as is typical in some States, would
encompass investigative branches of the judiciary especially in civil law
jurisdictions.
Questions that may arise about this provision concern the use of
terms, for example, whether thorough should also be used, rather than
only “prompt and impartial investigation” as currently worded. 212 The
formulation could then become “prompt, thorough and impartial
investigation.” 213 Further, investigations should only qualify if they are
carried out in good faith. Sham investigations that are intended to
shield or exonerate the suspects should not qualify. One might also
query about the type of knowledge that would trigger such an
investigation. I tend to the view that a State’s duty to ensure its
competent authorities investigate should be automatically triggered as
soon as the State simply becomes aware of the commission of crimes
against humanity. In the end, as to classification, it seems hard to put
207. Id. art. 12.
208. Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 7(1)(f).
209. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 8.
210. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its FortyEighth Session, supra note 202, at 212.
211. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 8.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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this provision into the category of codification or progressive
development. The reality is that, while this draft article seemingly
consolidates the implicit duty to investigate norm found in
international and regional human rights treaties as well as penal
instruments (torture) and applies it explicitly to crimes against
humanity, it could be a mix of codification and progressive
development. At the same time, since extensive State practice,
precedent and doctrine seems lacking, within the codification meaning
of Article 15 of the ILC Statute, it may more plausibly be a form of
progressive development. 214
K.

Draft Article 9—Preliminary Measures When an Alleged Offender
is Present

Article 9 provides that States have a duty, when an alleged offender
is present in their territory, to take preliminary measures such as
placing the suspect in custody or taking other legal measures. 215 For the
most part, draft article 9, which is comprised of three separate
paragraphs, is a replica of article 6 of the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 216
In the first paragraph, it provides that where the circumstances so
warrant “any State in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person
alleged to have committed any offence covered by the present draft
articles is present shall take the person into custody or take other legal
measures to ensure his or her presence. The custody and other legal
measures shall be as provided in the law of that State, but may be
continued only for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal,
extradition or surrender proceedings to be instituted.” 217
In the second paragraph, “[s]uch State shall immediately make a
preliminary inquiry into the facts.” Finally, in the third paragraph,
when the State “has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately
214. Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Is there Something Missing in the Proposed
Convention on Crimes Against Humanity? A Political Question for States
and a Doctrinal One for the International Law Commission, 16 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 877, 908 (2018) (arguing that the ILC in recalling the duty
of States to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity in the preamble has implicitly determined that the duty of
every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity exists without necessarily providing the basis for that
conclusion, and thus, that the approach to the crimes against humanity
project represents progressive development rather than codification).
215. Id.
216. Int’l Law Comm’n, Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee
(June
9,
2016),
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/statement
s/2016_dc_chairman_statement_cah.pdf&lang=E
[ https://perma.cc/57LQ-7B4Y].
217. Id.
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notify the States referred to in draft article 7, paragraph 1, of the fact
that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant
his or her detention. The State which makes the preliminary inquiry
contemplated in paragraph 2 of this draft article shall promptly report
its findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends to
exercise jurisdiction.”
The idea that States must take preliminary measures to address
crimes against humanity has been expressed in General Assembly and
Security Council resolutions. It is also supported in State practice, at
least in so far as torture and other similar penal treaties are concerned.
The Commission’s commentary draws on relevant ICJ jurisprudence,
on torture, to flesh out the nature of the obligation that such measures
would ordinarily entail. Given the paucity of investigations and
prosecutions of the crime at the national level, however, it is not
entirely clear whether this provision can be said to constitute
codification instead of progressive development.
L.

Draft Article 10—Aut Dedere Aut Judicare

The draft convention also includes the perhaps misnamed duty to
prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut judicare) in draft article 10.218
This provision is a natural follow-up to article 9 and provides that, if
the circumstances so warrant, States must submit the cases to their
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution unless they
extradite that person to another State or competent international penal
tribunal. 219 In reality, as framed in the first reading draft convention,
the provision only establishes an obligation on the State in the territory
under whose jurisdiction the alleged offender is present to submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purposes of prosecution, unless
it extradites or surrenders the person to another State or competent
international criminal tribunal. 220 One issue that could arise is whether
an international instrument should impose on prosecutorial discretion
by requiring the prosecution of a case when the decision to do so would
typically depend on the quality and quantity of evidence available.
Generally, members speaking in the ILC Plenary debate supported the
inclusion of this provision, with some linguistic suggestions. 221 In the
Drafting Committee, there was discussion over this provision—
specifically the following:

218. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 10.
219. Id. art. 9.
220. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its FortyEighth Session, supra note 202, at 31.
221. Id.
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[W]hether to assert in [then] draft article 9 that the obligation
contained therein was “without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offence was committed in a territory under its
jurisdiction.” This expression is used in some treaties as a matter
of emphasis. The Drafting Committee concluded that it was not
necessary to include this clause, but that the unequivocal nature
of the obligation set forth in the draft article should be stressed
in the commentary. 222

This idea was indeed stressed in the commentary for this
provision. 223
[D]iscussion also took place as to whether “international criminal
tribunal” should be qualified by language to say that it must be
a tribunal whose jurisdiction the sending State has recognized, as
appears in article 11, paragraph 1, of the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance. 224

However, this was ultimately deemed to be unnecessary.
The final report on the Commission’s separate project, on the duty
to prosecute or extradite, was clear that there are important gaps in
existing international law concerning this duty in relation to most
crimes against humanity. 225 It had concluded, in the context of its work
on the Draft Code of Crimes against the peace and security of mankind
of 1996, that there was an obligation to prosecute or extradite in
relation to crimes against humanity alongside genocide and war
crimes. 226 The more recent project has since concluded that this
obligation stated in the 1996 code was driven by the need for an
effective system of criminalization and punishment, suggesting that it
had been adopted as a matter of progressive development.227 While that
does not make it less authoritative or more doubtful because of its
inclusion in the draft crimes against humanity convention, the more
specific project had even conceded that the earlier finding did not
appear to be driven by State practice and opinio juris to that effect.
Yet, as an analogous crime to genocide, a rudimentary equivalent that
222. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 75, at 147.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See generally Final Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, The Obligation to
Prosecute
(2014),
Extradite
or
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/reports/7_6_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2B8-CSTV].
226. Id. ¶ 3.
227. Id.
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does not necessarily match the text found in draft article 9 can be found
in the Genocide Convention.
In the circumstances, though this point is not free of difficulty,
considering the practices of States in relation to other crimes since the
1950s, it would appear that the inclusion of this standard can be said
to be a form of progressive development of existing law prohibiting
specific crimes albeit now applied in relation to crimes against
humanity. 228 This approach helps to fill a void in the contemporary
legal framework that could not exist in relation to this crime since no
multilateral treaty has been concluded to prohibit it in the same way
we have had for torture or enforced disappearances. 229
M.

Draft Article 11—Fair Treatment of the Alleged Offender

Draft Article 11 of the first reading text requires that States shall
take necessary measures pertaining to the rights of alleged offenders.230
It requires that any person against whom measures are being taken in
connection with an offence covered by the draft articles shall be
guaranteed at all stages of the proceedings fair treatment, including a
fair trial, and full protection of his or her rights under applicable
national and international law, including human rights law. 231 It also
requires the person who is arrested or detained to be notified of the
right to communicate without delay with the State of nationality of the
person or the State which is otherwise entitled to protect his/her rights.
Such persons also have the right to a visit by the representative of the
State(s) concerned. 232
The provision has two components at least one of which represented
pure codification. The first relates to the concept of fair trial rights,
which will fall in the former category and second, the issue of fair
treatment, most likely constituting progressive development. 233 There
are aspects of the provision, which for example confers the benefits of
consular access also to stateless persons, that may or may not reflect
current customary international law and thus amount to progressive
development. 234
Fair trial rights are relatively narrower in scope and are provisions
prevalent in national constitutions, legislation, and numerous decisions
found at all levels of national courts and regional and international
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 11 (1).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See id.
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courts and tribunals. 235 The pedigree of this provision in international
human rights, including in the International Bill of Rights 236 and in
regional and national instruments is so well settled, that it would be
consistent with a view that it amounts to the extensive State practice,
precedent and doctrine that is required for codification. Such fair trial
standards, which could be read as inclusive of the broader notion of
“fair treatment,” also apply in the field of international criminal law.237
Indeed, just about all the statutes of international penal courts
established to prosecute international crimes since World War II,
including crimes against humanity, incorporates fair trial provisions.238
The references to the highest protections offered by international law
provide an additional form of protection to alleged offenders under the
draft article. 239
Two questions arise for me here. First, the language of the draft
article and its commentary carries some ambiguity. On the one hand,
it suggests that it is intended to ensure the “fair treatment” of “any
person” against whom measures are being taken in connection with
crimes against humanity covered by the draft articles “at all stages of
the proceedings.” 240 One could read the latter to include preliminary
investigations against a suspect in line with Draft article 9, paragraph
2, through to commencement of criminal proceedings when the target
of the investigation is arrested or detained. 241 Suspects, before they are
formally charged, enjoy certain rights. The clearest expression of this
can be found in the Rome Statute. 242 Though this standard here would
be applicable in relation to national courts, which have other
235. See e.g., ICRC, Rule 100: Fair Trial Guarantees, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule100
[https://perma.cc/6PBC-QGN5].
236. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents art. 9,
Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime art. 16, Dec. 12, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Mar. 4, 1964, 596 U.N.T.S.
261; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 10,
(Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
237. See ICRC, supra note 235.
238. Id.
239. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 11(1).
240. Id.
241. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 9.
242. Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 55.
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protections, it might be helpful to clarify how this distinction can be
accommodated.
Second, although it seems implied, there is no specification in the
draft articles that the fair treatment provision (and for that matter
several others such as Draft Article 9, 11 and 12) may only apply to
natural (not also legal persons). 243 It might be worth clarifying this since
some national jurisdictions may provide for the prosecution of legal
persons for crimes against humanity under Draft Article 6. Any
provisions in that regard must be consistent with the national law of
the State concerned. Presumably, since a corporate body is a mere legal
fiction through which human beings act, it might not be entitled to the
same fair trial rights as those enjoyed by a natural person.
N.

Draft Article 12 – Victims, Witnesses, and Others

The draft articles also provide, under draft article 12, for the
protection of the rights of victims, witnesses and others. 244 Such a
provision is not typically found in international instruments before the
1980s but now has a similar place in, among others, Article 68 of the
Rome Statute. 245 The provision, a form of progressive development,
requires each State to take the necessary measures to ensure that any
person who alleges that acts constituting crimes against humanity have
been or are being committed has the right to complain to the competent
authorities; provides for protective measures for complainants, victims,
witnesses and others who participate in any investigation, prosecution,
extradition or other proceeding; and requires States to ensure that
victims of a crime against humanity have the right to obtain reparation
for material or moral damages, on an individual or collective basis,
consisting, as appropriate, of one or more of the following or other
forms: restitution, compensation, satisfaction, rehabilitation, cessation,
and guarantees of non-repetition. 246
This broadly framed provision indicates that the rights of victims
under international law are also of significance in the context of crimes
against humanity. 247 The clause addresses a range of issues, from
participation to reparations for victims of crimes against humanity.248
This provision, in view of the enhanced standing for victims in both
modern international human rights and international criminal law,
could be read as constituting codification. It could be understood as an
243. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, art. 9.
244. Id. art. 12.
245. Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 68.
246. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, at 92.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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existing standard merely extended to apply to a draft convention. The
case could be stronger for progressive development.
In the Drafting Committee debate of this clause, some members of
the Commission suggested the inclusion of the elements set forth in
Article 68 of the Rome Statute in the commentary to draft article 12.249
There were also some reservations about this provision. 250 While many
members welcomed it, some questioned whether it would be better to
include a definition of who a victim is. 251 I could see the argument to
not have a definition, which was the preference of the Special
Rapporteur and ultimately the Commission itself. At the same time, in
my view, a basic definition of “victims” could have been provided to
establish a floor, rather than a ceiling, for States.
In plain terms, this means that it would be without prejudice to a
broader definition that may be available to provide even greater
protections under national law. This could better ensure that a common
or shared understanding of victimhood is provided for, as different
national systems would have different definitions. A basic definition
could also help ensure greater consistency and greater rights across
different national jurisdictions. For instance, in some national systems,
legal persons can be victims. Yet, in the crimes against humanity
context, it might be more in line with the goals of the prohibition of
the crime to encompass natural persons only. The latter posture would
be consistent with Rule 85 of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure. 252
A second potential issue relates to the duty to provide a remedy for
victims in the form of reparations which, in principle, I fully share. That
said, I wondered whether it would be imposing a realistic obligation for
many States afflicted with mass commission of crimes against humanity
to provide that the State must ensure that the victims of a crime
against humanity have the right to obtain reparation for material and
moral damages on an individual or collective basis. This could work
well in circumstances of small-scale commission of such crimes. It would
no doubt be highly beneficial for victims. On the other hand, since
crimes against humanity occur when there are widespread or systematic
attacks against a civilian population, the question arises whether the
249. Int’l Law Comm’n, Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee
on Crimes Against Humanity, art. 12 (June 1, 2017),
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/statement
s/2017_dc_chairman_statement_cah.pdf&lang=E
[https://perma.cc/PZ5C-NMP4].
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, First Session, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, 10 (Oct. 31,
2002).
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same obligation might not work as well in situations of commission of
mass atrocity crimes.
For example, take States such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and
Liberia, all of which were embroiled in devastating conflicts or
transitioning out of them in the 1990s. 253 Hundreds of thousands were
victims of those conflicts. 254 The question is when there are so many
victims, how a State might approach the duty to give effect to victims’
rights . In some of these atrocity contexts, the concerned State may
also be on the verge of failure and have many priorities. Can such States
realistically give effect to such a right to obtain individual and collective
reparations? The commentaries to the provision seemed to acknowledge
this difficulty, leaving a margin of discretion for States. But that margin
might not be as wide as might be necessary for post conflict States.
There were also additional concerns about, if the crimes are perpetrated
by non-State actors rather than State actors, what duty would that
entail for the concerned States. Will they bear the duty, say in civil
wars, to compensate the victims even if they or their organs did not
cause or participate in causing the harm?
O.

Draft Article 13—Extradition

The purpose of this relatively lengthy draft article 13 is to set out
the rights, obligations and procedures applicable to the extradition
process, in the event that extradition is to take place. 255 It anticipates
each of the offences covered by the draft articles shall be deemed to be
included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing
between States. 256 States undertake to include such offences as
extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded
between them. This provision can be described as a “mini-extradition
treaty within the treaty.” 257 It is one of the most important provisions,
considering present gaps in the law, which I fully supported. 258 It is
rooted, at bottom, in a long line of legal instruments on extradition
253. See e.g., Mba Chidi Nmaju, The Role of Judicial Institutions in the
Restoration of Post-Conflict Societies: The Cases of Rwanda and Sierra
Leone, 16 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 357 (2011).
254. World Peace Foundation, Mass Atrocity Endings Sierra Leone, (Aug. 7,
2015) https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sierra-leone/
[https://perma.cc/K7QZ-SFLD]; World Peace Foundation, Rwanda:
1994
genocide
and
aftermath
(Aug.
7,
2015)
https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/rwanda-1994genocide-aftermath/ [https://perma.cc/V8ZV-S5A4].
255. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, art. 13.
256. Id. art. 14(2)–(3).
257. Id.
258. Id.
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that may suggest its inclusion constitutes a form of codification of
existing law, again, albeit, now applied specifically to crimes against
humanity.
Furthermore, although they frequently occur in political contexts
and are sometimes perpetrated for political gain, core international
crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are
not to be regarded as “political offences” for the purposes of denying
extradition. Paragraph 2 of the draft article makes this clear. 259 This
principle is enshrined in Article VII of the Genocide Convention.260
Equally, though not found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it is
consistent with the more recent State practice when concluding
multilateral treaties addressing specific international and transnational
crimes. 261 Thus, its inclusion likely would help crystallize State practice
and consolidate customary international law.
One concern with this provision is that Draft Article 13, paragraph
1, provides for “each of the offences covered by the present draft
articles” to be deemed extraditable offences. 262 There seems to be some
lack of clarity regarding the scope of application. One plausible reading
is that this only applies to Draft Article 3, which defines crimes against
humanity, and is the object of the entire draft articles. Another reading
is that it would additionally include Draft Article 6 requiring States to
take the necessary measures to ensure that various other acts (such as
attempting or ordering and soliciting crimes against humanity) are also
offences under their national criminal laws. The former interpretation
might be the preferable one. This uncertainty would be hopefully
clarified by the Commission during the second reading stage of the
topic. This article, being largely derived from existing standards albeit
applied in transnational crimes and other contexts, could largely
constitute customary international law and therefore be a form of
codification.
P.

Draft Article 14—Mutual Legal Assistance

Article 14 contains general obligations with respect to mutual legal
assistance. 263 It requires States to afford one another the widest measure
of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial
proceedings in relation to the offences covered by the draft articles in

259. Id. art. 13(2).
260. Genocide Convention, supra note 60, art. 7.
261. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
262. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, art. 13(1).
263. Id. art. 14.
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accordance with the draft article. 264 Like the preceding clause on
extradition, this detailed provision on mutual legal assistance appears
equally fundamental to the regime that would be established by a future
crimes against humanity convention based on the ILC draft. 265
The wide scope of paragraph 1 and its applicability to the different
forms of “investigations,” “prosecutions,” and “judicial proceedings”
seems important. 266 Mutual legal assistance is to be provided to the
“fullest extent possible” under paragraph 3. 267 In paragraph 3, which
sets out the types of assistance that may be sought, the list contained
therein is illustrative and not intended to be exhaustive. 268 We can also
assume that requests for mutual assistance may also be made for more
than one of the purposes mentioned. The provision also has an annex
which must be read together with it.
In the end, though seemingly applied for the first time in the
context of this crime, I am tempted to argue that this provision
constitutes a codification of existing law. There were also some changes
to standard clauses found in extradition treaties to better address the
specificities of crimes against humanity. The removal of the dual
criminality requirement makes sense, in the context of crimes against
humanity since it would otherwise stand as an obstacle to inter-State
cooperation. But it might constitute a form of progressive development.
Given the nature of crimes against humanity, this seems warranted—
as mentioned in my intervention on the topic during the first reading
in 2017. 269
Q.

Draft Article 15—Settlement of Disputes

The purpose of draft Article 15, which is the last substantive
provision in the first reading of the draft convention, is to govern the
settlement of inter-State disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of the draft articles. 270 The Commission typically does not
address such final clauses, since these types of issues are usually the
preserve of States. 271 In this case, it was felt that it ought to do so. 272 It
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. art. 14(2)–(3).
268. Id. art. 14(3).
269. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n., 69th Sess., 3350th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.3350 (May 3, 2017).
270. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, art. 15.
271. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 249.
272. Id.
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thereafter sought to adopt a provision that would give a measure of
flexibility for States in that they could agree to arbitration instead of
litigating their differences before the ICJ. 273
Such an approach makes sense, especially in the context of treaties
that entail reciprocal obligations for States, for instance, treaties of an
economic nature. I wondered whether, given the inherently
humanitarian purpose of the subject matter under consideration, this
approach would be a realistic one. Furthermore, for reasons of parity, I
preferred that the Commission basically follow the dispute settlement
clause provided in Article IX of the 1949 Genocide Convention. 274

IV. Some Potentially Problematic Aspects of the
First Reading Draft Articles on Crimes Against
Humanity
A.

General Remarks

On balance, though in my view a potentially groundbreaking
development from an ICL point of view, it can be noted that some of
the ILC’s draft provisions were at times sensitive within the
Commission itself. 275 Thus, as is so often the case with such processes,
it seems important to explore what the ILC omitted from its first ever
draft crimes against humanity convention. For the same reasons,
wearing the hat of an independent academic, one might query certain
choices made by the Commission. Among the various substantive issues
that the ILC did not fully address in the draft articles in my view, some
of which were well debated within the Commission, four aspects seem
particularly worth highlighting. Here, I will set aside controversies
regarding final clauses, such as the issue of permissibility of reservations
or the format of the dispute settlement clause, to focus only on four
aspects. Those issues are important, but generally tend to be matters
for States to address during treaty negotiations.
My concerns relate to the following four substantive issues: (1)
retention of potentially problematic aspects of the definition of crimes
against humanity; (2) the lack of a full immunity clause, tracking
Article 27 of the Rome Statute in its entirety, for a convention aimed
at complementing the ICC’s jurisdiction; (3) the lack of a provision
prohibiting State grants of blanket amnesties for crimes against
humanity; and lastly, (4) lack of a substantive proposal for a treaty
monitoring mechanism. Addressing these issues might have been more
in line with the underlying purpose of such a convention. They would
have been, if not codification, useful proposals for States as forms of
progressive development. It would then have been up to States to
273. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, at 118.
274. Genocide Convention, supra note 60, art. 9.
275. See generally, Int’l Law Comm’n., supra note 249.
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accept or reject them once they receive the final text and
recommendation from the Commission in the General Assembly.
B.

The Use of the ICC Definition of Crimes Against Humanity

Firstly, as already indicated, the ILC draft article 3 definition of
crimes against humanity was largely copied from Article 7 of the Rome
Statute. 276 It was said that only three slight textual changes were
necessary to reflect the different context in which the definition is being
used. 277 The reality was that some of these changes were deeper and
more substantive. They had the effect of narrowing down the definition
of the crime even vis-à-vis the Rome Statute definition. In this regard,
three potential criticisms could be highlighted.
First, Article 7 of the Rome Statute contains a definition of
“gender” which was a compromise provision to satisfy certain groups
that wanted to specify a meaning that would guide the future
application. 278 Interestingly, this definition of gender appears to have
been overtaken by events since the adoption of the Rome Statute in
July 1998. 279 More inclusive definitions of the term have been offered
by numerous human rights bodies. 280 To the point that even organs of
the ICC itself, such as the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”), has
abandoned this definition as per the Prosecutor’s June 2014 “Policy
Paper on Sexual and Gender Based Crimes.” 281 Though that OTP
policy paper was published several years ago, the issue appeared to not
have been raised or even debated in the Commission up to the first
reading stage. It would be interesting to see whether States and others
will make submissions on the issue, and if so, what the response of the
ILC might be.
One possibility would be to review the definition if the members
could agree a change is required and use a more recent definition of
gender. The challenge with this option would be that what is accurate
today might be quickly deemed out of touch with evolving
understandings in another ten, twenty, or thirty years. This will
essentially bring us back to where we are now with the ICC Statute.
276. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 3 commentary, ¶ 1.
277. Id.
278. Id. ¶ 59.
279. See, e.g., U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Gender
Equality
Policy,
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/GenderEqualityPol
icy_September2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA4E-KVNA].
280. Id. at 24.
281. International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on
Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, ICC, 3 (June 2014), https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-policy-paper-on-sexual-and-gender-based-crimes-june-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN9L-GKFJ].
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Another option, which is perhaps more likely as it is more practical,
would be to simply delete the definition. The disadvantage of the latter
approach might be that an inconsistency may result for States party to
the Rome Statute, which may have incorporated this aspect into their
national law, when domesticating the ICC Statute. The solution, of
course, would be—should those same States join the future
convention—to modify their national laws to match the draft
convention approach. Of course, there will be some States that prefer
the retention of the ICC definition, for reasons of consistency or a deep
commitment to the Rome Statute definition of gender.
A second issue concerns the definition of some of the underlying
crimes in the Rome Statute. Some were seen as narrower than
customary international law following the ICC Statute’s adoption on 1
July 1998. 282 For instance, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kupreškić has
found that the ICC definition of the crime of persecution is not
consistent with customary international law. 283 By using the ICC
definition of crimes against humanity, in Article 7, the ILC risks
reinforcing a definition of persecution as a crime against humanity that
was not only considered narrower than customary law but that
contradicts its own earlier position on the matter. This is especially the
case during its work on crimes against humanity in the Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 284
Of course, the inconsistent definitions of crimes against humanity
dates back many decades, starting with the Nürnberg and Tokyo
Tribunal definitions through to an array of definitions used in the
modern ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR and even the
ILC’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind. 285 In Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, the crime required a link
to armed conflict, whether international or non-international in
character. 286 Whereas, in Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, the crime was
defined to require discriminatory intent in order to establish proof of it
whether on “national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”
which requirement was not reflected in Article 18 of the 1996 Draft

282. See generally, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
283. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreki (Kupreškić), Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal
Judgment, ¶1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001).
284. Peace and Security, supra note 30.
285. Id.
286. United Nations International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 5,
S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993)
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Code. 287 If anything, there has been a shifting mix of legal ingredients
concerning, in addition to the requirement of a nexus to an armed
conflict, whether a widespread and/or systematic attack against any
civilian population, or discriminatory grounds, are required. 288 These
elements of the definition have, in the words of Larissa van den Herik,
“been swapped back and forth in a cacophony of definitions.” 289 And,
we have not yet even mentioned the apparent confusion, including
among ICC judges, surrounding the State or organizational policy
requirement of crimes against humanity contained in Article 7 of the
Rome Statute. 290
One might make suggestions for changes for the second reading
stage of the project. Let us take a prominent example of the crime of
persecution as a crime against humanity. As defined, it prohibits, in
Draft Article 3(1)(h), “persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with
any act referred to in this paragraph or in connection with the crime of
genocide or war crimes.” 291 A good potential change could be to Draft
Article 3 paragraph 1(h) to remove the wording “in connection with
the crime of genocide or war crimes” since this terminology does not
reflect customary international law. 292
The deletion of the entire second half of subparagraph (h) will bring
the definition of persecution as a crime against humanity into
consistency with the prior work of the ILC on the Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind as well as its definition
under customary international law. Indeed, this connector requirement
287. United Nations International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, S.C. Res. 955
(Nov. 8, 1994).
288. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, at 31–42.
289. Larissa van den Herik, Using Custom to Reconceptualize Crimes Against
Humanity, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS 80 (Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 2010).
290. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 50-54 (Mar.
31,
2010),
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/338a6f/pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2ST-ZR53] (containing a seminal ruling regarding the
scope of crimes against humanity); see also Charles C. Jalloh, Situation
in the Republic of Kenya, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 540 (2011) (discussing the
seminal ruling regarding the first ever proprio motu prosecutorial
investigation pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute); What Makes a
Crime, supra note 290, at 419.
291. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, art. 3(1)(h).
292. Id.
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between the crime of persecution and two other core crimes, which is
specific to the ICC, cannot be found in the statutes of any of the ad
hoc international or internationalized tribunals, nor in the national
legislation of States in different parts of the world or in the
authoritative leading case law. A related issue is that, even if the
connector is kept, then it would make sense to revise it for the sake of
consistency. Revising it allows the curing of an omission. The reason
being that, at present, it essentially excludes another important ICC
connector crime from the definition (i.e., the crime of aggression) while
retaining the connection requirement for the other three Rome Statute
crimes. This is an understandable omission as the ICC States only
incorporated and activated that crime four months after the ILC first
reading text was adopted.
As the ICTY Trial Chamber ruled in Kupreškić, “although the
Statute of the ICC may be indicative of the opinio juris of many States,
Article 7(1)(h) is not consonant with customary international law.”293
This appears all the more striking considering that the application of
the provisions contained in Part II of the Statute (on jurisdiction,
admissibility and applicable law), including Article 7 on crimes against
humanity, are restricted by Article 10 of the ICC Statute which affirms
in unequivocal language that “Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted
as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of
international law for purposes other than this Statute.” 294 It follows, as
the States that drafted the Statute themselves made clear, “the Statute
did not intend to affect, amongst other things, lex lata as regards such
matters as the definition of, among other crimes, crimes against
humanity.” 295
Further, the complexity of defining persecution could lead to
confusion. This is because the retention of a connecting link to “any act
referred in this paragraph” could be read as a requirement of a link to
one of the underlying crimes against humanity set out in paragraph 1,
namely, (a) murder, (b) extermination, (c) enslavement, (d)
deportation or forcible transfer of population, etc. This would be a high
threshold but would be consistent with general understandings of this
paragraph in the ICC Statute and most academic literature.
293. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreki (Kupreškić), Case No. IT-95-16-T,
Judgment, ¶ 580 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14,
2000),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kuptj000114e.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG7Z-6MUA].
294. Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 10 (emphasis added).
295. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreki (Kupreškić), Case No. IT-95-16-T,
Judgment, ¶ 580 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14,
2000),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kuptj000114e.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG7Z-6MUA].
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On the other hand, some academics such as Robert Cryer and
others have speculated that if the connection required can be “satisfied
by a linkage to even one other recognized act (a killing or other
inhumane act),” 296 the “requirement should not pose a significant
obstacle for legitimate prosecutions of persecution.” 297 In any event, as
the ICTY Trial Chamber explained in Kupreškić, this restriction in the
definition “might easily be circumvented by charging persecution in
connection with “other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health” under Article 7(1)(k).” 298
Relatedly, it seems possible to contemplate a serious form of
persecution, which is not connected to another underlying crime. The
ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence, for the most part, have considered
persecution in situations where it examined crimes for which an accused
had already been found responsible and then examined whether those
same crimes were also committed with a discriminatory intent, and if
so, the person was then also responsible for the crime of persecution.
This shows gravity without a connection. Moreover, in the ad hoc
tribunals, there have been instances where persecution was used almost
as a residual crime with no connection whatsoever to the contents of
other residual crimes, specifically in the area of hate speech and
property crimes; to require a connection could stunt this development
altogether. 299
On the other hand, to complicate matters even further, the crime
as defined in the ILC’s first draft of the crimes against humanity
convention is evidently narrower than the present definition of it under
customary international law. 300 It seems settled that today the crime
would require “a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population.” 301 It equally seems settled that it can be committed by
perpetrators, during times of war or peace. 302 Yet, other questions
remain. For instance, take the State policy requirement, which is

296. ROBERT CRYER, ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION
LAW AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2014).

TO INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

297. Id.
298. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreki (Kupreškić), Case No. IT-95-16-T,
Judgement ¶ 580 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14,
2000),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kuptj000114e.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG7Z-6MUA].
299. Id.
300. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 249, at 44.
301. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, art. 3(1).
302. Id. art. 2.
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arguably settled under customary law. 303 The ICTY Appeals Chamber,
in its earlier case law found the State or organizational policy
requirement relevant, but later it held in Kunarac in 2002 that the
crime as defined in customary law no longer required proof or
furtherance of a State or organizational policy for finding the existence
of a crime against humanity. 304 This important judicial decision was
made in contradiction to the decision of States meeting in Rome in
1998, which had chosen to codify the State or organizational policy
requirement in the chapeau of Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute. 305
Against this wider historical context, it seems prudent to emphasize
that, for the ILC, the focus was not to resolve the legal debate between
the customary law or Rome Treaty definitions of crimes against
humanity. The Commission seemed to choose the ICC definition purely
for pragmatic reasons, as mentioned earlier on in this article. 306 It should
not be read as a rejection of the wider definition still available to States
to investigate and prosecute crimes under customary international law.
For that reason, I welcomed the explanation in its commentary to the
definition contained in Article 3 of the draft crimes against humanity
convention. 307 The ILC has explained that the definition it had
borrowed from Article 7 of the ICC Statute was “appropriate” mainly
because it had already been accepted by more than 120 State parties
to the Rome Statute. 308 The Commission also considered it highly
relevant that the same definition is now being used by many States
when adopting or amending their national laws to domesticate the ICC
Statute. 309 On top of that, a good number of States, which are
303. See What Makes a Crime, supra note 290; William A. Schabas, State
Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 953, 961–62 (2008); LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT (2004); Claus Kress, On the Outer
Limits of Crimes Against Humanity: The Concept of Organization Within
the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections of the March 2010 ICC Kenya
Decision, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 855, 861 (2010).
304. Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case. No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KCY-8CZA].
305. See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session,
U.N. Doc. A/70/10, at 8 (2015).
306. See What Makes a Crime, supra note 290, at 391.
307. See Statement of the Chair of the Drafting Committee (May 22, 2019),
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/statements/2019_dc_ch
airman_statement_cah.pdf [https://perma.cc/79HC-J5R3].
308. See Rome Statute, supra note 59.
309. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N.
A/72/10 (2017) (detailing the comments and observations from the
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presumably more likely to accept the future convention, had indicated
that they supported the ILC crimes against humanity project on the
condition that it retained consistency with the Rome Statute. 310 So, this
is all about pragmatics, which in context makes sense, rather than
about freezing developments in the customary law of crimes against
humanity.
The threshold question, in relation to these three select concerns
about the definition now being used by the Commission and borrowed
from the Rome Statute: (1) the meaning of gender, (2) persecution, and
(3) the State or organizational policy, will be whether to reopen Article
7 of the Rome Statute based definition in the ILC draft upon second
reading. If it is reopened, the question will be what changes can be
justified, and what changes cannot be justified, and the basis for making
that decision. Guidance could be found using standard criteria. For
example, making only the changes proposed by a large group of States.
On the other hand, if States do not raise the issues and the ILC does
not revisit the definition, it could be argued that consistency with the
ICC would have been achieved. The cost could be that an opportunity
for potentially positive advances in clarifying the law of crimes against
humanity, especially as codified in a possible future convention, would
have been lost. Assuming, of course, the States themselves do not
choose to amend the draft definition if and when they negotiate a crimes
against humanity convention based on an ILC draft.
Overall, the criticisms raised above do not take up the question
whether the Commission should have reflected advances since the Rome
Statute was adopted in July 1998 to use, for example, the broader
definition of enforced disappearances reflected in the treaty adopted by
the General Assembly in New York in December 2006. 311 Nor did they
take up the possible need that might have existed to include severe
damage to the environment as crimes against humanity. Of course,
States could always choose to address those issues once they receive the
final ILC draft crimes against humanity treaty in 2019 – as they did

Republic of Sierra Leone on the International Law Commission’s Draft
Articles on Crimes Against Humanity).
310. See Leila Nadya Sadat, A Contextual and Historical Analysis of the
International Law Commission’s 2017 Draft Articles for a New Global
Treaty on Crimes Against Humanity, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 690–
91 (2018).
311. See Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, The International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
OF
EUROPE
(Nov.
4,
2011),
Disappearances,
COUNCIL
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2011/ajdoc45.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X24B-TEBY].
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with respect to several matters arising from the Commission’s draft
statute for a permanent ICC in 1996. 312
C.

Failure to Prohibit Immunities for Crimes Against Humanity

A second issue that the Commission did not address in the text of
the draft articles as adopted on first reading was the question of
immunity of State officials, or for that matter, the officials of
international organizations in relation to investigations and
prosecutions of crimes against humanity. 313 As discussed in the Special
Rapporteur’s Report, “treaties addressing crimes typically do not
contain a provision on the issue of immunity, leaving the matter to
other treaties addressing the immunities of classes of officials or to
customary international law.” 314 The Special Rapporteur listed several
treaties and conventions that do not include provisions on immunity of
State officials or officials of international organizations. 315 Ultimately,
the position was that the Commission need not address the issue of
immunity in the context of the crimes against humanity topic. 316 There
was already a separate topic considering the issue of immunity of State
officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. 317 This position makes sense,
and ultimately, is defensible.
But there was also another view. In the Plenary debate, of the
Special Rapporteur’s report, several members proposed that the
Commission could address one aspect of the immunity issue. 318 It could,
for the sake of complementing the ICC system at the national level,
advance the equivalent of Article 27 of the Rome Statute in the draft
articles. 319 Article 27 is the ICC’s irrelevance of official capacity clause,
312. See, e.g., Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind
with commentaries, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 35.
313. See INT’L L. COMM’N, Current status of the work of the Commission and
forthcoming
deadlines, https://legal.un.org/ilc/status.shtml
[https://perma.cc/Q2YS-D5ZU] (showing the question of immunity was
not addressed until 2013).
314. Murphy, Third Rep., supra note 78, ¶ 281.
315. See id.
316. See id. ¶ 284.
317. See id.
318. See Int’ Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3350, at 11 (2017).
319. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3349, at 5 (May 2, 2017); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on
the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3350, at 7
(June 2, 2017); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3351, at 12 (June 12, 2017); Int’l Law
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which makes procedural and substantive immunities, whether at the
national or international level, irrelevant for the purposes of prosecution
of four of the most serious international crimes, including crimes against
humanity. 320
For the ICC States Parties, this rule applies because the States
have consented by expressly accepting this clause. 321 The thought was
that using such a clause could offer a more complementary regime to
the ICC even if it is a form of progressive development rather than
codification of existing law. States would have the opportunity to not
only pronounce on that clause in written comments, but to also decide
whether to keep it, should they accept to negotiate a convention on
crimes against humanity based on an ILC draft. 322 The non-inclusion of
a full Article 27 equivalent seemed to also be problematic because, at
the least, it was thought that the ILC should not advance a gap-filling
draft crime against humanity convention partly rationalized on a logic
of parity with the Genocide Convention while including less than the
minimum terms provided for in the parallel treaty adopted in 1948 for
the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. 323
As far back as 1947, the ILC was tasked with formulating the
Nürnberg Principles referred to at the opening of this article. 324 Those
were later endorsed by the General Assembly. 325 Principle III provides
that “the fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a
crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible
Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.3352, at 8 (June 2, 2017). But see Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep.
on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3352, at
10 (June 2, 2017).
320. See David P. Stewart, Official Immunity Under the Rome Statute: The
Path from Principle to Practice Is Seldom Straight, JUST SECURITY (Apr.
10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54678/official-immunity-underrome-statute-path-principle-practice-seldom-straight/
[https://perma.cc/L3GC-ZVHW].
321. See, e.g., id.
322. See, e.g., Sixth Committee Debate Agenda Item 79: Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its 71st Session, UNITED
STATES
MISSION
TO
UNITED
NATIONS
(Oct.
29,
2019), https://usun.usmission.gov/sixth-committee-debate-agenda-item79-report-of-the-international-law-commission-on-the-work-of-its-71stsession/ [https://perma.cc/MU8G-KFYP].
323. See generally G.A. Res. 260 A(III) (Dec. 9, 1948) (detailing the terms in
the 1948 Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).
324. See Text of the Nürnberg Principles Adopted by the International Law
Commission, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 374, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.2.
325. See id.
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international law.” 326 Building on that development, which is said to
constitute customary international law, Article IV of the 1948 Genocide
Convention explicitly provided that “persons committing genocide or
any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals.” 327
It followed that, if as far back as 1948 States were willing to give
up the immunities of their leaders involved with the commission of
genocide for the purposes of prosecution in their own territories; or
those of other contracting parties to the convention at the horizontal
level; or before an international penal tribunal that might be established
for such purpose at the vertical level, why might the Commission not
ask them to consider doing so for the equally heinous crimes against
humanity? That fundamental question, in my view, was insufficiently
debated and ultimately remained unanswered by the ILC which
essentially followed the preference of the Special Rapporteur on the
issue.
Interestingly, in both its past work on the 1954 and 1996 Draft
Code of Crimes, the Commission had carefully examined the issue of
official position. 328 It concluded that such a principle was totally
irrelevant to the question of individual criminal responsibility in
Articles 3 and 7 respectively, which were to apply in respect of both
national and international courts. 329 In fact, in its helpful commentary
to Article 7 of the 1996 Draft Code, the Commission did not mince
words when it stated:
The absence of any procedural immunity with respect to
prosecution or punishment in appropriate judicial proceedings is
an essential corollary of the absence of any substantive immunity
or defence. It would be paradoxical to prevent an individual from
invoking his official position to avoid responsibility for a crime
only to permit him to invoke this same consideration to avoid the
consequences of this responsibility. 330

326. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Second Session, U.N. Doc.
A/1316, at 375 (1950).
327. Genocide Convention, supra note 60, arts. 4, 12.
328. Peace and Security, supra note 30 (detailing the Commission’s
examination of the issue of official position in 1954 and detailing the
Commission’s examination of the issue of official position in 1996).
329. See id. at 27.
330. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/51/10, at ¶ 50 (1996) (Articles of the draft Code of Crimes against
the Peace and Security of Mankind).
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Accordingly, in adopting a more recent stance that apparently
reverts to an earlier abandoned distinction between substantive and
procedural immunities with the applicability of the former to crimes
against humanity but not the latter, the ILC can be said to have
adopted a contradictory doctrinal position. The new position appears
to not have taken into enough account if not ignored the prior work of
the Commission and may raise other questions. 331 Indeed, it muddies
the waters concerning the value of the practice of States in respect of
crimes against humanity, since at least the Nürnberg and Tokyo
Tribunals. 332 This is because the statutes of those special tribunals also
engendered the same non-immunity clauses as reflected in Article 7 of
the Nürnberg Charter and Article 6 of the Tokyo Charter as well as
Article 11(4) of Control Council Law No. 10.333 Ironically, the same
ILC, in the context of its separate project on immunity of state officials
from foreign criminal jurisdiction, has provisionally adopted Draft
Article 7 providing that immunity ratione materiae from the exercise
of foreign criminal jurisdiction shall not apply in respect of, among
others, crimes against humanity. 334 The Commission had adopted an
earlier article addressing immunity ratione personae, in Draft Articles
3 and 4, which remain intact for the troika for all acts performed during
or prior to their term of office. 335 The immunities continue to attach
under Draft Article 6(3) even after the term of office ends. 336
The ILC’s 2017 decision not to include a full irrelevance of official
capacity clause,in the draft crimes against humanity convention, could
also risk the significant advances made by States in developing the
admittedly still nascent field of international criminal law. The trend,
which many thought settled until recently, has been to limit immunities
in the context of the commission of core crimes since at least the early
1990s if not much earlier back to Nürnberg, a process to which the

331. Peace and Security, supra note 30, at 11–12 (detailing some examples of
the Commission’s prior work and questions surrounding the official
position).
332. See Jalloh, supra note 306, at 395.
333. See id. at 395–96.
334. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session,
U.N. Doc. A/74/10, at 311 (2019).
335. See id. at 312 (detailing Draft Article 3); Sean D. Murphy, Immunity
Ratione Personae of Foreign Government Officials and other Topics: The
Sixty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission, 108 AM. J. INT’L
L. 41 (2014) (detailing Draft Article 4).
336. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
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Commission itself has made useful contributions. 337 Indeed, since the
adoption of the Nürnberg Principles, the statute of every full
international criminal tribunal has repeatedly affirmed the essence of
the Third Nürnberg Principle. 338 Thus, we find the logic of the principle
enshrined in Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute and Articles 6(2) of the
ICTY and SCSL Statutes, and ultimately, it was embedded in a fuller
form in Article 27 of the ICC Statute. 339 A plea to official capacity has
not been successful in the judicial practice of all the modern tribunals
as the trials of Milosevic, 340 Kambanda, 341 and Taylor 342 amply
demonstrated.
Despite the significant precedents, which admittedly occurred in an
international tribunal rather than national court context, it was
positive that the ILC could find a compromise to include a Draft Article
6, paragraph 5 in the first reading text of the convention. 343 That
barebones, but still important provision, along the lines of Article 27
(1) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, provides that “[e]ach State shall
take the necessary measures to ensure that, under its criminal law, the
fact that an offence referred to in this draft article was committed by
a person the holding of an official position is not a ground for excluding
criminal responsibility.” 344 This clause was directed at ensuring that
States will take measures to deny persons involved with crimes against
humanity the opportunity to claim exemption from substantive
criminal responsibility or to use it as a defense to criminal liability.345
Elsewhere, in the commentary, it is also usefully clarified that official

337. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/72/10, at 179–80 (2017).
338. See id. at 168.
339. See 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 236-37 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3rd
ed. 2008).
340. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Preliminary
Motions, ¶ 26–34 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 8,
2001).
341. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23, Judgment, ¶ 37–38,
48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 19, 2000).
342. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶ 458
(Special Court for Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013).
343. See Madaline George, Prospects for a Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Humanity, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 10, 2019),
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/10/08/prospects-for-a-convention-on-theprevention-and-punishment-of-crimes-against-humanity/
[https://perma.cc/QR47-QCL9].
344. Rome Statute, supra note 59, at art. 27.
345. Id.
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position is not a mitigating factor that can be used to claim a reduction
in a sentence. 346
The commentary to the compromise clause, however, goes on to
make crystal clear that at paragraph 31 that “paragraph 5 has no effect
on any procedural immunity that a foreign State official may enjoy
before a national criminal jurisdiction, which continues to be governed
by conventional and customary international law.” 347 In addition, the
commentary clarifies that “paragraph 5 is without prejudice to the
Commission’s work on the topic of “[i]mmunity of State officials from
foreign criminal jurisdiction.” 348 The provision, in Draft Article 7,
indicates that immunities ratione materiae from the exercise of foreign
criminal jurisdiction shall not apply in respect of crimes against
humanity which are as defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 349 Yet,
to be consistent with the ILC’s own work on the immunity topic, which
had provided that no exceptions to immunity would apply in relation
to crimes against humanity, it might have been appropriate to examine
the implications of that stance also for this topic. 350 The ICC definition
of the crime, of course, formed the basis for the ILC definition (as
discussed above in Part III). 351 This would mean, that if given effect, it
might have meant there would also be no immunity ratione materiae
for crimes against humanity at the national level. 352
Consequently, although a handful of members argued against
downgrading the ILC’s historically strong position against immunity
for core crimes, the result is that the first reading of the draft articles
on crimes against humanity do not contain the equivalent of Article 27
(2); instead, it only contains a rough equivalent of Article 27(1).353

346. See COMMENTARY OF THE LAW OF
276 (Mark Klamberg ed., 2017).

THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT

347. See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 37.
348. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC AT ITS TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY 33 (Pavel
Šturma ed., 2019).
349. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/72/10 (2017) (stating Draft Article 7); Rome Statute, supra note
59, at art. 7.
350. See generally Tladi, supra note 97.
351. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 59, at art. 7 (showing the ICC’s
definition of crimes against humanity) with Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on
the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L/853 (2015)
(detailing the ILC’s definitions of crimes against humanity).
352. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/72/10 (2017).
353. See Adil Ahmad Haque, Immunity for International Crimes: Where Do
(Apr.
17,
2018),
States
Really
Stand?,
JUST SECURITY
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Adding the second paragraph would have rendered immunities or
special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a
person, whether under national or international law, as no bars
preventing the courts of a State Party to the future convention from
exercising their jurisdiction over such a person. 354 The consent of the
State, expressed through ratification or accession, would effectively
have acted as a national jurisdiction’s waiver of any available
immunities of its leaders from prosecution for crimes against humanity
in the national courts of other States. The State consent element offers
the vital safeguard needed, even if one believes that customary law
immunities at present remain intact for crimes against humanity before
the national court of third states for heads of state, heads of government
or foreign ministers, as the ICJ ruled in its somewhat controversial
Arrest Warrant ruling in early 2002. 355 Of course, should they so wish,
the ICJ statement of customary law on a given legal point such as
immunity before national courts does not stand as an impediment to
States with regard to their adoption of a (new) rule that might be
contrary to such ruling since, as a matter of principle, ICJ rulings are
only binding on the parties to a case and even so only in respect of that
particular case. Following Article 27 in its entirety would, in the end,
arguably have been more consistent with the Rome Statute position.
The ILC first reading approach of divorcing Article 27, paragraph 1
from Article 27, paragraph 2 was not inevitable. Although it has
sometimes been disputed whether it removed all procedural and
substantive immunities, or only some of them, an alternative approach
might have been to resort to full importation of Article IV of the
Genocide Convention. That provision basically stated that persons who
commit genocide, or conspiracy to genocide, or incitement to genocide,
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers,
public officials or private individuals. If the full Article 27 of the ICC
Statute could not be reproduced in the first draft of the ILC’s draft
crimes against humanity convention, why not use similar language to
that of the Genocide Convention which seemed to be familiar with and
to enjoy broad support among States.
That said, this alternative suggestion, which seemed initially
agreeable to the Special Rapporteur, later changed without

https://www.justsecurity.org/54998/immunity-international-crimesstates-stand/ [https://perma.cc/G2YZ-L3J8].
354. See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 27.
355. Steffen Wirth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in the
Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 877, 877 (2002).
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explanation. 356 The Rapporteur fell back on the Article 27 (1)
equivalent, when inserting the prior negotiated compromise. 357 No
reason for the change was given. 358 One can speculate that this might
have been because of a desire to avoid the possible argument of parity
with Article IV of the Genocide Convention. Such an article could then
have simply provided that persons committing crimes against humanity
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers,
public officials or private individuals. Some literature under the latter,
as well as the ILC’s prior work, suggests that all forms of procedural
and substantive immunities are irrelevant for the purposes of
investigation and prosecution of that crime. The same would be true
for crimes against humanity.
If that argument holds water, for the crime of genocide, it would
perhaps not be too much of a stretch to accept and argue that the same
can be true for crimes against humanity in respect of State parties to a
future draft crime against humanity convention. Copying the whole of
Article 27, rather than picking it apart, might have ensured greater
coherency with the ICC regime at least in relation to the treatment of
officials of the ICC’s current 123 State parties who may commit crimes
against humanity. 359
In the end, one could see the above argument as idealistic,
especially given the current environment where the very idea of
multilateralism and international law appears to be under attack. From
this point of view, it might be that the Commission has taken a position
that is more in line with the world in which it is functioning today. A
world that reflects pushback at international institutions such as the
type of pushback we see between the ICC and African States. The latter
has been largely driven by concerns about potential abuse and misuse
of rules on immunity. 360 In this environment, it can be argued that a
356. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 59, at art. 27 (detailing Article 27 of
the Rome Statute) and G.A. Res. 260 A(III) (Dec. 9, 1948) (detailing
Article 4 of the Genocide Convention).
357. See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 27.
358. See Commentary Rome Statute: Part 3, CASE MATRIX NETWORK,
https://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmn-knowledge-hub/icccommentary-clicc/commentary-rome-statute/commentary-rome-statutepart-3/ [https://perma.cc/8QPL-EF7R] (detailing the comments behind
the drafting of Article 27 of the Rome Statute) (last accessed Feb. 21,
2020).
359. See Ukraine accepts ICC jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed since
20 February 2014, INT’L CRIM CT. (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1146&ln=en [https://perma.cc/2AX68MZ2].
360. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND AFRICA (Charles C.
Jalloh & Ilias Bantekas eds., 2017).
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more pragmatic view might be that the project as a whole, even in the
absence of a proposal for a full immunity clause, reflected the right
balance since it is a more incremental way of developing ICL. In any
event, though this seems quite unlikely, States could also always choose
to incorporate such a standard during their negotiations of a new crimes
against humanity treaty. By the same token, though perhaps unlikely,
they could even choose to amend other aspects of the draft articles such
as the definition of the crime to address, for instance, severe
environmental destruction as a crime against humanity.
D.

Failure to Reject Blanket Amnesties for Crimes Against Humanity

A third issue regarding another element of the draft convention is
that the text of the draft articles did not substantively address the
challenging issue of amnesty for crimes against humanity. It was
thought that State practice regarding amnesties was too varied to
resolve the question whether amnesties for crimes against humanity are
permissible before national courts. 361 There was no “consensus” on the
issue since earlier treaties such as the Genocide, Geneva, Apartheid and
Torture Conventions did not prohibit amnesties. 362 Conversely, Article
6(5) of Additional Protocol II encouraged States to enact amnesties to
end hostilities. 363 More recent instruments addressing serious
international crimes, such as the ICC Statute and the Enforced
Disappearances Convention, did not preclude amnesties either. 364 The
conclusion can thus be reasonably reached, as did the Commission, and
that there is at present no general prohibition imposed on States from
passing amnesty laws for these types of crimes.
On the other hand, some members of the Commission were of the
view that the ILC’s no blanket amnesty clause position could have
better considered the rich if admittedly still evolving domestic, regional,
and international jurisprudence on the topic. 365 The Special
Rapporteur’s third report on the topic, speaking mostly to the Belfast
361. See Max Pensky, The Amnesty Controversy in International Law, in
AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY 42 (Leigh
Payne & Francesca Lessa eds. 2012).
362. See id. at 45.
363. See Amnesties and International Humanitarian Law: Purpose and Scope,
COMM.
OF
THE
RED
CROSS
(Oct.
4,
2017),
InT’L
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/amnesties-and-ihl-purpose-andscope.
364. See Pensky, supra note 361, at 49 (detailing the Enforced Disappearances
Convention); id. at 65 (detailing the ICC Statute).
365. See Fifth Report on State Responsibility, [1993] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
99, U.N. A/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add.1 (detailing the different discussions
around amnesty and its role in evolving law).
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Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability, seemingly obfuscated the
issue. 366 It did not fully account for the distinction between blanket and
conditional amnesties, which might lead to different legal results. 367 The
ILC could have better grappled with the rich body of jurisprudence of
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals on amnesty and their full
implications for the system. From there, the ILC could have then
contemplated whether, and if so, how to apply a similar system at the
horizontal inter-State level.
Let me take the example of the SCSL 13 March 2004 Appeals
Chamber decision on amnesty in the Kallon Case. 368 In that case, the
defendant filed a preliminary challenge to the jurisdiction of the
SCSL. 369 He submitted that the Government of Sierra Leone was bound
to observe the amnesty granted under Article IX 370 of the Peace
Agreement to the RUF and that it could not thereafter participate in
establishing a special tribunal whose statute included a clause denying
legal effect to the amnesty conferred on them. The Appeals Chamber
determined that the grant of amnesty or pardon is undoubtedly an
exercise of sovereign power which, essentially, is closely linked, as far
as the crime is concerned, to the criminal jurisdiction of the State of
Sierra Leone which was exercising such sovereign power. 371
That said, where jurisdiction was shared with other States—as
would be the case for a future crime against humanity convention—one
State cannot deprive another State of its jurisdiction to prosecute the
offender by the grant of amnesty. The SCSL Appeals Chamber rightly
ruled that, for this reason, it would be unrealistic to regard as
universally effective the grant of amnesty by a State regarding grave
international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, in which there
would exist a broad grant of jurisdiction as per the provisions discussed
earlier. 372 Indeed, it would stand to reason, as the SCSL Appeals
Chamber explained that “[a] State cannot bring into oblivion and
forgetfulness a crime, such as a crime against international law, which
366. See Murphy, Third Rep., supra note 78, ¶¶ 285–297.
367. See Rachel W. Smith, From Truth to Justice: How Does Amnesty Factor
In? A Comparative Analysis of South Africa and Sierra Leone’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commissions (University of Connecticut, Honors
Theses
2010),
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&cont
ext=srhonors_theses.
368. See Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on
Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty (Mar. 13, 2004).
369. See id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 67.
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other States are entitled to keep alive and remember.” 373 If this is true,
of the Sierra Leone vis-à-vis the SCSL situation, would it not be even
more true for a future crime against humanity convention which States
can freely agree to?
Furthermore, one could also take note of the policies of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations since the Lomé Peace Accord
in July 1999. 374 Under that policy, blanket amnesties are not permissible
for core international crimes. 375 In the end, although the practice of an
organ of an international organization may not be conclusive evidence
of the practice of the Member States in that regard, it is also not
entirely irrelevant to the analysis given that States do not appear to
have objected to the Secretary General’s policy. The ILC has in fact,
while working on the topic of identification of customary international
law, accepted that it might secondarily be relevant to look at the
practice of States undertaken within the context of an international
organization. 376 In the final analysis, on the amnesty issue, the
Commission compromise forged was the fall back inclusion of some
commentary better discussing the more recent State practice relating
to amnesties in draft article 10 on “Aut dedere aut judicare” at
paragraphs 8 to 11. 377
The commentary is fairly strong in almost looking down on
amnesties. It acknowledges “that a national law would not bar
prosecution of a crime against humanity by a competent international
criminal tribunal or foreign State with concurrent jurisdiction over that
crime.” 378 And, even within the State that has adopted the amnesty,
the ILC has now made ever clearer that “its permissibility would need
to be evaluated, inter alia, in the light of that State’s obligations under
the future draft articles requiring that they criminalize crimes against
humanity, as well as against their duty to comply with their aut dedere
373. Id.
374. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Establishes
UN Mission for Sierra Leone to Aid with Implementation of Lome Peace
Agreement, U.N. Press Release SC/6742 (Oct. 22, 1999) (showing
examples of policies since the Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999).
375. See Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court
for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915, ¶ 22; Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case
No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé
Accord Amnesty, ¶ 71 (Mar. 13, 2004).
376. See Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law,
with commentaries, [2018] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 122, U.N. Doc.
A/73/10.
377. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Final Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/579 (2014).
378. Murphy, Third Rep., supra note 78, ¶ 297.
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aut judicare obligation as well as those in relation to victims and
others.” 379 These are important elements that needed to be added to
the commentary for clarification of the ILC position on amnesty, lest it
be another carte blanche for States to continue to pursue such
amnesties in their national law including for crimes against humanity
which are some of the world’s worst crimes. It was not obvious that
these important clarifications would have been made without serious
pushback from a minority of members of the Commission. The present
author played a role leading informal negotiations to find an acceptable
compromise on the amnesty issue as well as immunities/irrelevance of
official capacity.
E.

Absence of a Recommendation on a Monitoring Mechanism

Finally, the ILC drat articles has not proposed any provisions for a
monitoring mechanism, such as that under the Convention against
Torture. A monitoring mechanism could help ensure future State party
compliance with the obligations derived from a future convention on
crimes against humanity. Such monitoring mechanisms are standard
features of the major human rights treaties, including the Human
Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). 380 They are also found in many other modern
human rights instruments, including those concerning racial
discrimination, 381 women, 382 children, 383 and disability. 384 Monitoring
bodies are also familiar in criminal law treaties such as the Torture
Convention. 385 The Third Report of the Special Rapporteur surveyed
monitoring mechanisms, such as those within the UN human rights
system, that already exist and could include crimes against humanity;
however, the Special Rapporteur preferred not to make a specific
379. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, UN
GAOR, 72nd Sess., Supp. No. 10, at art. 10, para. 11 UN Doc. A/72/10
(2017).
380. See FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR), ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr
[https://perma.cc/45A6-Z6BS] (last updated Apr. 2019).
381. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
382. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
383. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3.
384. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, May 3, 2008,
2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
385. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 17, June 26, 1987.
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proposal in this regard, a view that found support within the
Commission. 386
Though controversial, it was argued that the element of choice on
whether to propose one was more a matter of policy rather than law.387
The decision turns on, for example, the availability of resources and the
relationship of a new mechanism with those that already exist. So, it
was argued, such issues are best left for States to decide, should they
wish to do so. 388 Borrowing from an ILC Secretariat study of the issue,
it was observed that the present treaty monitoring body system had
caused significant financial and other strains on States. 389 States could
also choose to establish a treaty monitoring body for crimes against
humanity alongside other such mechanisms already in place, as part of
cost rationalization. 390 This is all true and defensible.
A minority view was that the Commission is equally well placed to
offer a recommendation. 391 A monitoring body was both a legal and
policy question, meaning that the ILC could study the issue and
formulate a recommendation. This group did not accept that this was
only a matter of policy, but also saw it as about being effective in the
design of a horizontal treaty framework. 392 A small number of members
even appeared to favor the idea of a monitoring body. 393 Given the stage
386. Murphy, Third Rep., supra note 78, ¶ 10.
387. Id. ¶ 238.
388. See id.
389. See Kelisiana Thynne, Reform of United Nations Human Rights
Institutions: Current Developments- Enhancing the rule of law in
international
human
rights
treaty
bodies,
WORLDLII,
www.worldlii.org/int/journals/IHLRes/2007/9.html
[https://perma.cc/BFA3-PBNW] (last updated Nov. 19, 2007).
390. See Adrienne Komanovics, Strengthening the Human Rights Treaty
Bodies: A Modest but Important Step Forward, PECS J. INT’L & EUR. L. 7
(2014).
391. See United Nations, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
60 (8th ed. 2012), https://legal.un.org/avl/ILC/8th_E/Vol_I.pdf.
392. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Sixty-Ninth Session, Provisional summary record
of the 3350th meeting (May 3, 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3350, at 10–
11 (June 2, 2017) (detailing Mr. Jalloh’s statement, concerning the
existence of a treaty-based monitoring mechanism).
393. See, e.g., id. at 10 (detailing Mr. Jalloh’s statement supporting a possible
monitoring mechanism); Int’l Law Comm’n, Sixty-Ninth Session,
Provisional summary record of the 3351st meeting (May 4, 2017), U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3351, at 7–8 (June 12, 2017) (detailing Mr. Hmoud’s
statement supporting the inclusion of a monitoring mechanism in the
draft articles); id. at 13–15 (detailing Mr. Saboia’s statement supporting
the inclusion of a monitoring mechanism to ensure a future convention
fulfills its goals); Int’l Law Comm’n, Sixty-Ninth Session, Provisional
summary record of the 3353rd meeting (May 8, 2017), U.N. Doc.
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of the project, it would be interesting to see if any State wishes to see
a recommendation for a monitoring body for crimes against humanity.
In the absence of an independent enforcement mechanism, the future
convention could be extremely weak and dependent solely upon State
cooperation, which can be more regularly monitored if a treaty body
mechanism is contemplated. 394 Thus, rather than being a policy
question outside of the ILC’s domain, this was a technical legal question
of a long-awaited treaty instrument concerning a core crime under
international law.
Thus, rather than taking no substantive proposals forward, the
Commission should not shy away from weighing the pros and cons of
such a mechanism and offering up a studied recommendation to States.
The Commission could have even developed alternative options for
States to consider using the existing mechanisms to cover this future
convention, even if on an optional protocol basis. The latter would allow
the main instrument to focus on prevention and punishment of crimes
against humanity. The optional protocol would then provide the choice
to join the treaty monitoring system. In any event, as with other aspects
of the proposed draft crimes against humanity convention as a whole,
it would be up to the States to decide ultimately whether they would
retain or abandon any final ILC proposals concerning a treaty
monitoring body. An interesting historical footnote here is that, while
the main ILC proposals for the ICC draft statute were retained, in some
cases such as the trigger mechanism which provided for an independent
prosecutor, the ILC was more modest in its proposals than States when
they met at Rome in 1998 to negotiate the ICC instrument. 395
For that reason, it may be that had a clause been included and
properly justified, it would likely have bolstered the case for such a
mechanism to UN Member States. Whereas the converse, that is the
non-inclusion of one, might also weaken the case for it. It could be
misread as sending a signal that the ILC did not consider the topic
important enough. Ultimately, the omission of a recommendation was
hidden behind policy rationales, but at bottom, it seemed aimed at
increasing the future political acceptability of the future convention.
The same might be said, concerning the issues of immunity, amnesties,
A/CN.4/SR.3353, at 3 (June 2, 2017) (detailing Mr. Ouazzani’s statement
supporting a monitoring body mechanism); id. at 6 (detailing Mr.
Vazquez-Bermudez’s statement supporting the draft articles calling for
the creation of two monitoring mechanisms); id. at 7 (detailing Mr.
Gomez-Robledo’s statement calling for the Commission to make a
recommendation regarding a monitoring mechanism).
394. What Makes a Crime, supra note 290, at 419.
395. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The International Criminal Court
Trigger Mechanism and the Need for an Independent Prosecutor (1997).
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and even the definition of crimes against humanity. This concern
appears true about other aspects of the draft convention as well.
In sum, there are many positive aspects the ILC’s first draft
convention on crimes against humanity. The present author is highly
encouraged by the progress that the Commission has accomplished to
date since taking up the crimes against humanity topic in 2014. 396 One
must particularly appreciate that we have a full draft convention that
may offer a single commonly accepted definition of the crime, as well
as the explicit duties of prevention and punishment that are required
of State parties under Articles 4 to 15 of the draft convention, including
the crucial elements of prevention and punishment, as well as modalities
for extradition and mutual legal assistance. 397 The latter were borrowed
from the transnational crimes context and offer the additional
advantage of addressing current normative gaps in the Rome Statute
legal framework. 398
I am also highly encouraged by the generally positive responses
received from approximately fifty States during the debate on crimes
against humanity in the Sixth Committee in October 2017.399 It is my
hope that many if not all those States, as well as others, will go on to
provide the detailed commentary that the Commission has invited by
December 2018. This will enable the ILC, especially if States reflect and
provide guidance on the difficult questions including the definition,
immunities, amnesties, and monitoring mechanisms, to further
strengthen the final instrument that it will present to them after
completion of the second and final reading of the draft convention.
One potentially major challenge, which is already evident, is that
all friends of the ILC and ICL will need to work hard to ensure that
States in the General Assembly do not place the draft convention on
the shelf—as they have so often done with many other more recent ILC
396. See generally Leila Nadya Sadat & Kate Falconer, The UN International
Law Commission Progresses Towards a New Global Treaty on Crimes
Against
Humanity,
ASIL
(Jan.
25,
2017),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/2/un-international-lawcommission-progresses-towards-new-global-treaty
[https://perma.cc/8DXF-VNJP] (showing examples of the progress made
with the crimes against humanity topic).
397. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session,
U.N. Doc. A/70/10 (2015) (detailing the definition of crimes against
humanity); Int’l Law Comm’n, Prevention and punishment of crimes
against humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.935 (2019) (discussing Articles 4
to 15).
398. See Caroline Davidson, How to Read International Criminal Law: Strict
Construction and the Rome Statute of the International Court, 91 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 37, 86 (2017).
399. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-Second Session,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/72/SR.20, at ¶ 22 (2017).
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projects. There are States that are working on a parallel mutual legal
assistance initiative, led by the Netherlands. The content of the draft
treaty that they seek to conclude is not known, save that it will address
mutual legal assistance and extradition for three core crimes, namely,
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. Those same States
will hopefully also support, if not adopt, the outcome of the ILC’s work
when it is completed as possibly a starting point for the negotiation of
their treaty text. 400 I hope that the ICC too, which so far has shown
little substantive interest in the crimes against humanity project, will
engage with the Commission on the issue—as the ICRC does regularly
on subjects concerning the law of armed conflict.

V. Conclusion
Overall, this article sought to demonstrate that the ILC’s mandate
to promote the progressive development and codification of
international law permeates all its work. The mix of the two can be
found in many of its projects over the course of the past seventy years.
That in turn reflects the integrated nature of the tasks of codification
and progressive development of international law. This mix of
progressive development and codification can also be found in the
subfield of international criminal law, as demonstrated by this article,
which has focused on the Commission’s latest project in this subfield in
relation to the topic of crimes against humanity. The paper has
suggested that some, if not most of the 15 draft provisions adopted by
the Commission on first reading in 2017, may reflect codification of
existing law. To the extent that the extension of an existing rule already
recognized by States to cover a new situation will fall within the
meaning of that term under Article 15 of the Statute and in the practice
of the Commission.
In any event, even if some of the other provisions can be said to be
progressive development, that too would be within the mandate
entrusted to the ILC by States. Indeed, far from being separable, the
tasks seem intertwined, interdependent and indivisible. In this scheme,
even within a single provision such as the crimes against humanity
definition, there will be aspects that can also be said to reflect
customary international law, meaning that those aspects will be
considered codification rather than forms of progressive development.
The recognition of the delicate task seems to be confirmed by the earlier
practice and experience of the ILC and the works of academics. In other
words, the draft articles on crimes against humanity are not one or the
other; rather, as with most ILC texts, they are an approximate mix of
both.
400. See id.
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It is also appropriate for the effective prevention and punishment
of one of the worst crimes known to international law for the
Commission, where necessary, to advance gap filling proposals even
though these may amount to progressive development. Importantly, to
the strict constructionists of international law that might insist on a
clear distinction between the two tasks, it is important to emphasize
that it will in the end be up to States to decide how to approach the
Commission’s final work product. This topic on crimes against
humanity will be no different. The way it has been treated also properly
recognizes the separation of functions between the role of independent
experts and the representatives of States in the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly. 401 It is hoped that, when they eventually receive the
recommendation of the Commission on the draft convention on crimes
against humanity, States will find it fit to take the item forward and
finally fill one of the currently missing links in the substantive law of
international crimes. Well over half a century later, this important
crime will have been put on the same plane as genocide and war crimes,
both of which were codified in multilateral treaties as far back as 1948
and 1949. 402 If States choose to do so, it would potentially constitute
one of the Commission’s most important contributions to the
development of the nascent field of ICL.

401. See id.
402. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed
conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
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